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This dissertation evaluates the effects of the institutional environment on investment and 
performance in the private equity industry. It provides insights on how trade secret protection 
can increase venture capital (VC) investment through a state court’s favorability toward the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine, the effect of anti-takeover regulation as it relates to private equity 
firm buyout performance, and the role that political context has in determining VC distributions 
to different states. Data analysis is based on Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert for VC investment 
and geography, inevitable disclosure rulings gathered from multiple sources, a proprietary 
database on private equity firm buyout performance, and election results at the state and national 
levels of the United States. Three studies were conducted, which comprise this dissertation.          
The first paper investigates how inevitable disclosure, a form of trade secret protection, 
affects the geography of VC investment in the United States. Results show that a rule in favor of 
inevitable disclosure increases the overall amount of VC inflows and the proportion of 
investment by non-local VCs in a state more than an against or no rule. Mechanisms are 
addressed that can explain these findings by considering how a court decision on inevitable 
disclosure might increase the probability of obtaining a court injunction against a former 
employee departure and the predictability of that probability. 
The second paper extends experiential learning theory by arguing that the degree of 
causal ambiguity in firm decisions likely differs not only across different settings (i.e. 
operational vs. strategic), but also across different stages of the same strategic decision. With 
particular regard to acquisitions, the selection stage seems to be less causally ambiguous than the 
restructuring stage. Since experience translates into learning to a lesser extent when causal 
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ambiguity is greater, acquisition experience translates more readily into learning to select than 
into learning to add value. Accordingly, results show that more experienced acquirers should 
perform better in scenarios when the focal acquisition is more selection (rather than 
restructuring) oriented, such as when (1) the educational background of the acquiring firm’s top 
management is more finance (rather than business) oriented; and (2) the information 
environment is less transparent. Results are largely consistent with the notion that correlation 
between acquisition experience and performance is more positive when the firm’s capacity to 
select target companies is more relevant. 
 The third paper attempts to uncover the effects of political context, as it relates to VC 
distributions to different states across the United States. The primary finding is that VC 
investment distributions increase when states that elect a Republican governor also vote for a 
Democratic presidential candidate (regardless if that candidate wins). Additionally, as the 
stability of a Republican gubernatorial regime increases, VC investment decreases. Finally, 
results show that policies improving the quality of financial institutions might help explain the 
political effect (through the number of IPOs), whereas tax policy (through capital gains tax rate) 
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Private equity, which includes venture capital (VC), has become an important source for 
developing and nurturing economic development and entrepreneurship (Samila & Sorenson, 
2011a). In the first half of 2014, over $276 billion (USD) was invested by private equity firms 
in the United States (Private Equity Growth Capital Council, 2014). Considering only those 
companies with headquarters in the U.S., the private equity industry supports over 11,130 
companies and 7.5 million employees. Globally, it is estimated that there is $465 billion (USD) 
in buyout fund dry powder. 
Because of the potential impact that private equity investment can bring to a region, 
policymakers have taken great interest in creating an institutional environment conducive for 
private equity investment with the intent to spur economic growth and job creation (Lerner & 
Tåg, 2013). Using institutional theory (North, 1990; Scott, 1995), scholars have studied a broad 
range of topics concerning private equity and the institutional environment influenced by law 
makers and policymakers, such as intellectual property rights (IPRs) (Lerner and Tåg, 2013; 
Samila & Sorenson, 2011b), anti-takeover regulations (Armstrong, Balakrishnan, and Cohen, 
2012) and the political context that helps define the institutional environment (Pe’er and 
Gottschalg, 2011). This dissertation outlines the following three research objectives that 
contribute to the literature in each of the aforementioned topical areas and is aimed to provide a 
better understanding on how variations in the institutional environment affect the private equity 
industry. 
The second chapter discusses how a particularly strong form of trade secret protection, 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine, affects the geography of venture capital investment. The 
main idea in this study is that states where the trade secret protection is strong might 
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experience two types of effects that can increase investment from VCs. If a state favors the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine, (1) it could reduce the possibility of employees from leaving 
investee firms to join a competing company and (2) it would increase the predictability of a 
subsequent court ruling on the doctrine. Because both of these factors affect a VCs willingness 
to invest, a state that favors the doctrine would be expected to attract more investment 
compared to those states that are against the doctrine or have not ruled on it. While extant 
literature has predominantly shown that trade secret protection may have adverse effects on 
innovation and entrepreneurship, this result shows that there may be alternative forms of 
protection that can encourage and enhance investment rather than deter it.   
The third chapter presents how private equity experience acquired from buyouts 
translates more into learning to select targets, rather than learning to add value, such that more 
experienced PE firms perform better when the educational background of top managers at the 
PE firm is more finance oriented. Conversely, performance is worse when the educational 
background of top managers are more business oriented and the information environment is 
more transparent. This study extends the literature on experience and strategic decisions, 
namely those that occur during the selection stage, by disentangling selection stage strategic 
decisions from those related to value addition.  
 The fourth chapter discusses how political party orientation influences venture capital 
investment. In the United States, elected officials of the state and national executive branch are 
affiliated with two major representative parties: the Republican Party (“Red”) and the 
Democratic Party (“Blue”). Results show that states that have elected a Republican governor 
generate more VC investment when voting for a Democratic presidential candidate compared 
to a Republican candidate. Additionally, as the stability of a Republican gubernatorial regime 
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(the number of consecutive years any Republican sits in office) increases, the amount of VC 
investment decreases in a state. The balance achieved from voting for a Red Governor/Blue 
President configuration may be driven by the expectation for moderation in policymaking. 
While tax and pro-entrepreneurship policy do not seem to be explanatory mechanisms for the 
political effect on VC investment, policy affecting the quality of financial markets may help 

















2 Trade Secret Protection and the Geography of Venture Capital 
Investments: Evidence from the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine1 
Abstract 
This study investigates how inevitable disclosure—a legal doctrine by which an employer 
can enjoin a former employee from working in a job that would inevitably result in trade 
secret disclosure—affects the geography of venture capital (VC) investment. Using a 
dataset of VC deals realized in the United States from 1981 to 2013, we find that a rule in 
favor of inevitable disclosure increases the overall amount of VC inflows and the 
proportion of investment by non-local VCs in a state more than ruling against or no rule. 
We address mechanisms that can explain these findings by considering how a court 
decision on inevitable disclosure might increase the probability of obtaining a court 
injunction against a former employee and the predictability of that injunction. We also 
discuss managerial and policy implications of our findings. 
Introduction 
Venture capital (VC) plays a critical role in fostering regional entrepreneurship, innovation, 
and, ultimately, economic growth (Samila and Sorenson, 2011a). Given its importance, 
scholars and policy makers have been trying to better understand the factors that may condition 
the development of VC in a region. Prior work has looked at a diverse set of issues, including 
the presence of a stock market (e.g., Michelacci and Suarez, 2004), tax rates (Poterba, 1989), 
and intellectual property rights (IPRs) (e.g., Lerner and Tåg, 2013). 
With respect to the role of IPRs in VC, particular attention has been paid to the patent 
system (e.g., Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013; Mann and Sager, 2007), an important dimension of the 
IPR environment. Despite their role, patents are only part of IPRs. A further dimension of IPR 
                                                 
1 Submitted for review as: Kemeny, C., Castellaneta, F., Conti, R., and Veloso, F. Trade Secret Protection and the 
Geography of Venture Capital Investments: Evidence from the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine. 
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policy and practice is represented by trade secrets, defined as any information that derives 
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known.2 Given the 
breadth of knowledge potentially covered by the term, Halligan (2008: 3) argues that “the vast 
bulk of intangible assets are trade secret assets,” whereas Risch (2007: 656) notices that trade 
secrets are “the most important and most heavily litigated intellectual property rights.” 
Therefore, it appears significant to extend this line of inquiry into how legal protection 
associated with trade secrets might influence the presence and role of VC in a region. 
To help fill this gap, we focus on the inevitable disclosure doctrine, whose rule 
determines whether the owner of a trade secret can (if the rule is in favor of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine) or cannot (if the rule is against the inevitable disclosure doctrine) obtain a 
court injunction to prohibit a departing employee from working for a competitor or founding a 
rival firm, on the grounds that she could inevitably disclose trade secrets (Lowry, 1988). The 
inevitable disclosure doctrine can thus allow a company not only to protect its extant trade 
secrets but also to avoid the loss of valuable human capital at a competing firm’s advantage. 
In the United States, where the inevitable disclosure doctrine has predominantly been 
developed, the extent to which a state jurisdiction embraces the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
varies. Through its court precedents, a state may in fact adopt (a) a rule clearly in favor of 
inevitable disclosure, (b) a rule clearly against, or (c) no clear rule. These scenarios could 
condition the decisions of venture capitalists (VCs) to invest in a region. In particular, we argue 
that a region embracing a rule clearly in favor of the inevitable disclosure doctrine should 
                                                 
2 More precisely, the U.S. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, §1.4, defines a trade secret to mean “information, including 
a formula, pattern, compilation, program device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of 
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” 
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attract VC investments more than any other possible scenario (against, or no clear rule), for 
reasons related to the likelihood of obtaining a court injunction to restrict employee mobility. 
VC investors would generally prefer that key employees of an invested firm do not 
opportunistically leave the company to pursue opportunities in competition with the former 
employer (Baron, Hannan, and Burton, 2001). In this respect, a precedent in favor of inevitable 
disclosure increases the likelihood that a VC-backed firm obtains a court injunction against a 
former employee hired by a competitor (Png and Samila, 2013). Furthermore, given that a state 
court will tend to make decisions consistent with the precedent in any similar case at hand, a 
case clearly in favor of inevitable disclosure also enhances the predictability of this court 
injunction. Higher predictability is desired not only by risk-averse VC investors, who prefer a 
more stable institutional environment (Malesky and Samphantharak, 2008), but also by risk-
neutral investors, who might otherwise prefer to wait and see how the regulatory environment 
evolves before making investments (Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen, 2007). 
Clear rulings in favor of inevitable disclosure should also be more significant for non-
local investors than for local ones. A trustworthy relationship with key employees at an 
investee company can reduce their possible opportunistic behavior—including the risk that 
they leave to join a competitor or found a new company (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 2002; 
Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2008). This is harder to accomplish for VCs who are not local (e.g., 
Taussig and Delios, 2014), increasing for them the importance of a clear rule in favor of 
inevitable disclosure in the region. 
To empirically assess whether and how rulings on inevitable disclosure stimulate 
investment from VCs, we exploit longitudinal variation in inevitable disclosure rule in U.S. 
states, as determined by court precedents (Kahnke, Bundy, and Liebman, 2008; Klasa et al., 
7 
2014; Malsberger, 2011; Milgrim and Bensen, 2013b; Png and Samila, 2013; Quinto and 
Singer, 2009; Wiesner, 2012). We find that a favorable rule on inevitable disclosure stimulates 
VC investments (especially those involving non-local investors) more than any alternative rule. 
In particular, we show that a rule in favor of inevitable disclosure increases VC investment in a 
state by about 83 percent compared with where there is no rule, and by about 53 percent 
compared with where the rule is against the inevitable disclosure. Additionally, having a rule in 
favor of inevitable disclosure increases the proportion of VC investments by non-local 
investors within a state. In particular, considering those investments where at least one investor 
comes from a different state than the investee, a favorable rule increases their proportion by 6 
percent compared with having no rule on the doctrine or having a rule against it. 
Overall, this paper contributes to existing research in three ways. First, it extends the 
literature on the impact of the institutional environment on investments (e.g., Lerner and Tåg, 
2013; Pe’er and Gottschalg, 2011; Taussig and Delios, 2014), showing how and to what extent 
the inevitable disclosure rule conditions VC investments. Second, it extends the literature on 
trade secrets as an important IPR protection mechanism that affects innovation and 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Fosfuri and Rønde, 2004; Png, 2012a, 2012b). Third, we contribute to 
the literature on employer-friendly labor rules for innovation and entrepreneurship (e.g., 
Garmaise, 2011; Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 2009; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003).  
 
Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
IPR protection, inevitable disclosures and venture capital 
It is well established that VC plays a critical role in fostering entrepreneurship in a region 
(Samila and Sorenson, 2011a). Therefore, regions and countries have been seeking to increase 
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VC activity within their boundaries and are eager to identify policies and strategies that can 
have such an effect (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002). This has sparked a growing academic 
literature analyzing a variety of drivers of VC investments (Lerner and Tåg, 2013). 
A first driver is the financial market, which has been shown to significantly impact VC 
investment. For example, previous work has demonstrated that the efficiency of a public stock 
market attracts VC investment by enhancing the likelihood of the investee company to be sold 
through an initial public offering (IPO) (Black and Gilson, 1998). In line with this idea, Jeng 
and Wells (2000) find that nations with more IPOs have greater VC investment. Studies have 
also shown that regulatory changes regarding financial markets can affect VC fundraising. For 
instance, the deregulation of VC investment by public pension funds introduced in 1979 led to 
a subsequent dramatic increase in the amount of funds flowing to the VC industry (Gompers 
and Lerner, 2004; Kortum and Lerner, 2000). 
A second driver considered by prior research is the tax system. For example, VC 
activity is expected to increase when expected profits and returns increase as a result of lower 
capital gains tax rates (Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003). This was confirmed by Poterba (1989), 
as well as by Gompers and Lerner (1998), who found that reductions in capital gains tax rates 
in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s led to an increase in VC investment. 
A third driver is the impact of IPR protection regulation on VC investment. The core 
idea is that IPRs play an important role in determining the extent to which VCs can secure 
investee knowledge assets (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997). Therefore, IPR protection regulation 
should have an important impact on VC investment. Most existing literature on IPR and VC 
has focused on patents, showing how they can solve uncertainty related to opportunistic 
behaviors of VC transaction counterparts, both before (ex-ante) and after (ex-post) the contract 
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between investor and investee is signed. By requiring knowledge disclosure, patents make third 
parties better informed ex-ante about the value of a firm’s knowledge base. This reduces 
information asymmetry between investors and investee and encourages the former to invest in 
the latter (Akerlof, 1970; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Ex-post, patent protection reduces the risk 
of unintended knowledge leakages to rivals, for instance those associated with key employees 
opportunistically leaving a company to pursue better opportunities. The mitigation of this risk 
makes VC investment more profitable (Baum and Silverman, 2004b; Cao and Hsu, 2011; 
Häussler, Harhoff, and Müller, 2009; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013; Mann and Sager, 2007). 
To enrich this growing literature on IPR and VC, we focus on trade secret protection, in 
particular on the inevitable disclosure doctrine, a particularly strong form of trade secret 
protection. Trade secret protection is generally considered to be broader than protection 
granted by other IPRs, including patents, copyrights, and trademarks (Besen and Raskind, 
1991). First, whereas patent and copyright protection require subject matter to be novel, trade 
secret protection requires only that the subject matter derive some commercial value from not 
being known (Kitch, 1980). Second, patents, copyrights, and trademarks protect only explicit 
knowledge—that is, knowledge already articulated and stored in certain media. In contrast, 
trade secrets protect any proprietary knowledge that is not known to others and that can 
provide a competitive advantage, be that explicit or tacit knowledge. For instance, trade secret 
protection may not only encompass chemical formulae and customer lists, both of which can 
be stored and represent explicit knowledge, but can also include ‘negative know-how’ obtained 
by previously attempted but failed techniques or procedures (Graves, 2006), which is 
essentially tacit knowledge. Finally, unlike patent protection, trade secret protection is exempt 
from having an expiration date and may live as long as the knowledge is kept secret. The 
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economic importance of trade secret protection for firms and regions has been clearly 
demonstrated by prior work. For example, higher levels of trade secret protection have been 
shown to increase firm profits and to stimulate regional clusters (Fosfuri and Rønde, 2004), 
encourage more R&D investment (Png, 2014), and decrease labor mobility (Png, 2012). 
A critical element associated with the role of trade secrets, as in all dimensions of IPR, 
is enforceability. Although several aspects contribute to the enforceability of trade secrets 
(David, 1993), the extent to which they are in fact protected may critically depend on whether 
a jurisdiction embraces the inevitable disclosure doctrine. This doctrine determines whether the 
owner of a trade secret can (if the rule is in favor of the inevitable disclosure doctrine) or 
cannot (if the rule is against the inevitable disclosure doctrine) obtain a court injunction to 
prohibit a departing employee from working for a competitor, on the grounds that he or she 
could inevitably disclose trade secrets (Lowry, 1988). 
In the United States, where the inevitable disclosure doctrine has been predominantly 
developed, the rule is established through court precedents. This means that once the rule of 
law is established for the first time by a court for a particular case, it is thereafter referred to 
when similar cases are decided, effectively binding the future—which is the essence of the 
stare decisis principle (Hart, 2012; Horwitz, 1977; Landes and Posner, 1976).3 Hence, when a 
precedent in favor of inevitable disclosure is set, the doctrine can be used as an effective tool to 
prevent employees from working for other competing firms, based on the belief that they might 
unavoidably disclose and so misappropriate trade secrets (Godfrey, 2004). 
                                                 
3 While there is a possibility that individual courts might deviate from precedent, the appeals process to higher 
courts within each state lowers the probability that any disregard for precedent is systematic (Landes and Posner, 
1976).  
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The modern form of the inevitable disclosure doctrine was defined in 1995 with the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond. Despite other decisions having 
embraced the inevitable disclosure doctrine as a further reason to enforce a non-compete 
agreement4 or to grant a limited injunction,5 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond was the first court 
decision to issue a very broad injunction, which prohibited de facto a departing employee who 
had not signed a non-compete agreement from working for a competitor, on the grounds that 
he or she would inevitably disclose trade secrets (Mulcahy and Tassin, 2003).6 The defendant 
in that case was a high-level manager at PepsiCo who left to join a rival company. He had 
signed a confidentiality agreement with PepsiCo but had not entered into a covenant not to 
compete. The Seventh Circuit nonetheless affirmed a preliminary injunction restraining the 
new employment, explaining that a plaintiff may prove trade secret misappropriation by 
showing that defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s 
trade secrets. 
Since the PepsiCo case, six states (Illinois, Iowa, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, and 
Washington) have embraced the PepsiCo interpretation of the doctrine, and five states 
(California, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Virginia) have clearly rejected it. Another 
four states (Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, and North Carolina) had, even before 1995, 
rejected inevitable disclosure as an independent claim under which a court might enjoin a 
former employee from working for a competitor. In the remaining states, there is still 
                                                 
4 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prod., 189 A.D. 556 (N.Y.A.D. 1919) 
5 B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963) 
6 Furthermore, another important characteristic of PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond is that the trade secrets involved in 
the case were not of a technical nature, as was generally true in earlier cases considering inevitable disclosure.  
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uncertainty regarding a company’s ability to prevent an employee from moving to a competitor 
in the absence of a non-competition covenant. 
Although a large body of law literature has been devoted to studying the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine (e.g., Edelstein, 1996; Lowry, 1988; Whaley, 1998), this issue has received 
far less attention in the fields of management and public policy. In these areas, research on 
inevitable disclosure has only started to emerge in the last decade (Graves and DiBoise, 2006; 
Hyde, 2003; Png and Samila, 2013), probably because most of the inevitable disclosure cases 
in the United States happened between 1995 and 2004. Furthermore, previous literature has 
mainly focused on how inevitable disclosure rule could limit employee mobility, showing that 
rulings in favor of inevitable disclosure were associated with substantially lower mobility of 
technical workers (Png and Samila, 2013). However, research has not considered whether the 
court rulings in a jurisdiction may condition VC investment decisions.  
Inevitable disclosure rule and VC investments 
In all firms, but especially in start-ups, performance outcomes depend on a few critical 
employees, such as founders, who nurture the business (Campbell and Ganco, 2012; Colombo 
and Grilli, 2005; O’Boyle Jr. and Aguinis, 2012). Besides the loss of valuable human capital, 
departures of key employees can lead to knowledge leakage to competitors (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2003), thus reducing the competitive edge of the firm. The possibility of these 
departures might also mean that potentially profitable investments led by these employees will 
go unfinanced (Hart and Moore, 1994). Thus, the profit of a VC-backed firm—and the return 
of the VC investment—will crucially depend on the permanence of key employees (including 
founders), who might otherwise depart to join a competitor, or to establish a spinoff (Klepper, 
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2007). The ease with which key employees can move is therefore likely to be important for VC 
investors. 
Given these concerns, it is not surprising to find that, at the time of investment, VCs 
often establish contractual clauses that make it difficult for key employees to depart from the 
financed company. For example, VC investors could ask founders to sign a vesting clause, that 
is, “a legal arrangement in which the entrepreneurs’ shares are originally held by the company” 
(Hellmann, 1998: 58) and awarded over a multiyear period (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). If 
entrepreneurs were to leave before being fully vested, they might lose shares or the company 
might be able to buy back earned shares at a discounted price. Frequently, VC investors also 
mandate that VC-backed firms use non-compete clauses, which prohibit key employees from 
joining a competitor for a specified period of time (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). Although 
those clauses might be effective for reducing outbound mobility, entrepreneurs or key 
employees may seek extra compensation in exchange for signing them, which would be 
reflected naturally in lower VC-backed firm profits and returns to VC investments. In contrast, 
once a jurisdiction has embraced the inevitable disclosure doctrine, VC-backed firms could 
limit employee mobility through a court injunction even in the absence of any specific 
contractual clause. 
The extent to which U.S. state jurisdictions embrace the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
varies substantially according to court precedents. In particular, whereas some state courts have 
ruled clearly in favor of or against inevitable disclosure, others have reached unclear 
decisions—that is, ambiguous decisions that do not clarify exactly the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine’s scope of application—or have yet to decide on the doctrine. This generates three 
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possible contexts for a given state: (a) a rule clearly in favor of inevitable disclosure, (b) a rule 
clearly against inevitable disclosure, (c) no clear rule. 
With respect to the baseline case of having no clear rule, a rule in favor of inevitable 
disclosure should attract VC investors for two reasons related, respectively, to the expected 
value of obtaining a court injunction against a former employee hired by a competitor and to 
the predictability of that injunction. First, in the presence of a clear precedent embracing the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine, the likelihood of a court injunction increases (Png and Samila, 
2013). This result would naturally attract VC investors, whose returns depend on the ability of 
the firms they invest in to retain their best employees. Second, with a clearly favorable 
precedent, any court will most likely apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine to any similar 
case at hand in the same direction as previous cases. Higher predictability of court decisions in 
inevitable disclosure cases, compared with a scenario where there is no rule at all, should 
attract both risk-averse and risk-neutral investors. 
On one hand, higher predictability is clearly beneficial for risk-averse investors, who 
naturally prefer to invest in more predictable institutional environments (Malesky and 
Samphantharak, 2008). On the other hand, it might also be desirable for risk-neutral investors, 
who might otherwise prefer to wait and see how the regulatory environment evolves before 
making investments. When there is no clear precedent on the inevitable disclosure doctrine—
such that it is not certain whether and to what extent might courts embrace the doctrine in 
future cases—VC investors may turn to non-compete clauses to prevent employee departure. 
Yet, money associated with drafting and negotiating these terms with key employees might be 
wasted if, at some point in the future, a court precedent in favor of inevitable disclosure is 
established. Hence, even risk-neutral investors facing an uncertain legal environment might 
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prefer to wait and see how the environment will evolve before making investments. In real 
option terms, uncertainty about the legal environment makes the “option to wait” more 
valuable (Bittlingmayer, 2000; Bloom et al., 2007; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
Different from a rule in favor of inevitable disclosure, it is not apparent whether a rule 
against is superior to the baseline scenario of no clear rule. For instance, a clear rule against 
inevitable disclosure increases the predictability of a court decision and, as a result, should 
attract VC investment. However, it also decreases the possibility of retaining employees, as 
state courts would most likely allow employees to leave for other opportunities, which should 
translate into a decrease in VC investment. Hence, whether a rule against the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine increases VC investment more than not having any rule is an empirical 
matter. In fact, it depends on whether the benefits due to the reduction in regulatory uncertainty 
prevail over the costs related to the possible loss of the investee firm’s key employees. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the potential outcomes of having a clear rule in favor of or 
against inevitable disclosure, compared with the baseline scenario of having no rule, on the 
expected valued and the predictability of a court injunction against an employee deciding to 
leave for joining a competitor—and therefore on VC investments. 
Table 2.1 Anticipated effect of inevitable disclosure court rulings on the expected  value 
and predictability of a court injunction against a former employee 
Court ruling on inevitable disclosure 
With respect to having no rule 
Expected value of a court Predictability of a court 
Favorable rule Increase Increase 
Against rule Decrease Increase 
 
16 
Compared with the baseline no-rule scenario, a rule in favor of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine—different from no rule or a rule against inevitable disclosure—increases both the 
expected value and the predictability of a court injunction. Hence, VCs should be more 
attracted to jurisdictions where there exists a rule clearly in favor of inevitable disclosure than 
to jurisdictions with against or no rules. Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: A rule in favor of inevitable disclosure increases venture capital 
investments more than a rule clearly against inevitable disclosure or the absence of a clear rule. 
 
A favorable rule on inevitable disclosure should be more salient for a non-local investor than 
for a local investor. The former, compared with the latter, is more exposed to the risk of 
opportunistic behaviors by the investee firm’s key employees when formal rules safeguarding 
IPRs do not exist or are not enforced. In fact, a trustworthy transaction relationship—occurring 
when each party has no incentive to deviate from a correct behavior even in the absence of any 
safeguarding by formal institutions—is more likely to occur when the parties are 
geographically close to each other, for at least two reasons. First, trust is enhanced by the 
anticipated continuity of the relationship because expectations of payoffs from future 
cooperative behavior encourage cooperation in the present (Baker et al., 2002). In this respect, 
geographically proximate parties are more likely to transact again in the future. Second, trust is 
reinforced by face-to-face contact, which allows for information gathering and monitoring. For 
example, Bönte (2008) shows that geographical proximity between buyer and supplier in the 
aeronautical industry increased inter-firm trust.  
Hence, formal institutions protecting property rights should be less valuable for local 
actors than for non-local actors. For example, Taussig and Delios (2014) argue that in 
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developing economies, where formal institutions are typically weak in safeguarding and 
enforcing property rights, local private-equity firms are better than non-local firms at 
informally enforcing contracts. Similarly, Gans et al. (2008) found that the granting of a patent, 
a formal institution that protects IPRs, increases the probability of licensing, but this effect is 
muted when the patented innovation is produced in locations (such as Silicon Valley) where 
both the licensee and the licensor are predominantly local, such that trustworthy relationships 
have been built and substitute for the formal protection of IPRs. 
The previous arguments suggest that a local investor’s localness might help to 
informally prevent opportunism by a VC-backed company’s key employees, including the risk 
of those employees opportunistically leaving the investee company to join a competitor or to 
found a new company. Since non-local investors are more exposed to possible opportunistic 
behaviors by the investee company’s key employees, a favorable ruling on inevitable 
disclosure should be of greater relevance to them than to local investors. Hence, it should 
constitute a greater incentive to invest for non-local investors than for local investors. 
Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: A rule in favor of inevitable disclosure increases the proportion of venture 
capital investments by non-local investors more than a rule clearly against inevitable disclosure 
or the absence of a clear rule. 
Data and Estimation 
Data collection 
Our empirical analysis relies on a balanced panel of the 50 U.S. states and the District of 
Columbia from 1981 to 2013. Because variation in inevitable disclosure occurs at the state 
level, this is the most appropriate level of analysis. The time frame was chosen for two reasons. 
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First, the Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert dataset, which was used to gather data on VC 
investment, has limited coverage of investments realized in the 1970s and is thus fully reliable 
only since the 1980s (Gompers and Lerner, 2004). Second, most of the changes in rules 
concerning inevitable disclosure occurred during this period. 
From the VentureXpert database, we collected information about the amount of equity 
invested per deal, the investment date, and the location of both investee and investor.7 There 
were 95,346 deals completed within the relevant period, from which we excluded 153 because 
investee location information was unknown. State-level rulings of inevitable disclosure were 
gathered from various sources (Kahnke et al., 2008; Klasa et al., 2014; Malsberger, 2011; 
Milgrim and Bensen, 2013b; Png and Samila, 2013; Quinto and Singer, 2009; Wiesner, 2012).8 
Finally, we gathered state gross domestic product (GDP) data from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Overall, we constructed a balanced panel 
dataset of 1,683 state-year observations. 
Variables 
Dependent variables 
Venture capital investment. Similar to Samila and Sorenson (2011a), we defined VC 
investment as the equity investment associated with any VC deal at different stages of 
financing: seed, early, later, or in balanced stages. Deal equity was aggregated into state-year 
observations (by investee headquarters location and investment year). 
Proportion of VC investments by non-local investors. We defined an investment as 
realized by non-local investors if the headquarters state (or country) of at least one VC investor 
                                                 
7 Data was collected from the VentureXpert database on November 3, 2014. 
8 See Appendix: Table 2.A1. 
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firm differed from the headquarters state of the investee company (González-Uribe, 2014). We 
aggregated non-local and total investment totals into state-year observations and calculated the 
investments by non-local VCs. Observations with no investment amount were excluded 
because of their undefined values. 
Independent variables 
Inevitable disclosure rule. To measure inevitable disclosure rule, we first define the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine consistent with PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond as a legal doctrine through 
which, even without a covenant not to compete, an employer can enjoin a former employee 
from working for a competitor or founding a rival firm by demonstrating that the employee’s 
new job duties will inevitably lead to trade secret misappropriation (Kahnke et al., 2008). 
Based on this definition, we created three dummy variables measuring the rule on inevitable 
disclosure in each U.S. state, as established by court precedents, in any given year from 1981 
to 2013. In particular, the favorable dummy equals 1 if the state courts have clearly embraced a 
rule in favor of inevitable disclosure. Second, the against dummy equals 1 if the state courts 
have clearly embraced a rule against inevitable disclosure. Third, the no rule dummy equals 1 
if (a) the state courts have not ruled on inevitable disclosure or (b) they have ruled but without 
clarifying whether the doctrine can be applied to block an employee who has not signed a 
covenant not to compete. 
We also evaluated whether states experienced a precedent change due to new rulings 
that changed the state position on the doctrine by directly overruling the past precedent 
(Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2007). In every state that has clearly ruled on the doctrine, no higher 
court has directly struck down those rulings but has only distinguished them from precedential 
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rulings (Malsberger, 2011; Milgrim and Bensen, 2013b; Png and Samila, 2013; Quinto and 
Singer, 2009). 
Details on the criteria we used for identifying and codifying the most important 
sentences on inevitable disclosure in any state are discussed in the appendix. The resulting 
measures of inevitable disclosure rule are presented in Table 2.2. A more detailed list of all the 
sentences we took into account for measuring state rule on inevitable disclosure is presented in 
Table 2.A1. 
Table 2.2 State rule (precedent) on inevitable disclosure 
State  Year Rule 
California  1999 Against 
Florida 2001 Against 
Illinois 1995 Favorable 
Iowa  2002 Favorable 
Louisiana  1967 Against 
Maryland  2004 Against 
Massachusetts 1995 Against 
Minnesota  1992 Against 
New Jersey  1980 Against 
New York  1997 Favorable 
North Carolina 1976 Against 
Pennsylvania  2010 Favorable 
Utah  1998 Favorable 
Virginia  1999 Against 
Washington  1997 Favorable 
Note. Sources: Kahnke et al., 2008; Klasa et al., 2014; Malsberger, 2011; Milgrim and Bensen, 2013; 
Png and Samila, 2013; Quinto and Singer, 2009; Wiesner, 2012. 
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Overall, our identification strategy relies on the arguably true assumption that case-
specific court decisions are exogenous and so not driven by the willingness to attract VC 
investments or by the presence of an already active VC community. However, to verify the 
exogeneity assumption, we also check whether a ruling in favor or against inevitable disclosure 
is related to the state political orientation—which might be more or less prone to enact pro-VC 
policies (e.g., Pe’er and Gottschalg 2011)—and the past amount of VC investment in the state 
(cf. Table 2.11). 
Control variables 
Even though we consider the longitudinal changes in inevitable disclosure rule to be 
exogenous, we include control variables in the regression to limit the possibility that our results 
are biased due to the omission of important confounding factors. 
State GDP. Using BEA data, we control for state GDP, because it is a factor that could 
possibly confound our results (Samila and Sorenson, 2011b). For instance, in richer states, due 
to a more active economic environment, it is more likely that a court will decide on cases 
involving the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Hence, the probability of having no rule is lower. 
State fixed effects. We included state-specific fixed effects, in order to control for all 
time-invariant factors for each state, such as state culture. 
Year fixed effects. We included year dummies to account for variations in the economic 
environment that might affect VC, such as annual changes in interest rates, inflation, and the 
national GDP. 





Table 2.3 Operationalization of variables 
Variable Operationalization 
VC investment The amount of VC equity invested in each state (by location of investee 
company), in millions of nominal USD (all VC investments).  
Source: Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert. 
VC investment by VC funds 
only 
The amount of VC equity invested in each state (by location of investee 
company), in millions of nominal USD (VC funds only). 
Source: Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert. 
Proportion of VC 
investments by non-local 
investors 
The proportion of non-local investment from deals with at least one non-local 
investor (all VC investments).  
Source: Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert. 
Proportion of VC 
investments by non-local 
investors (VC funds only) 
The proportion of non-local investment from deals with at least one non-local 
investor (investments by VC funds only).  
Source: Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert. 
Favorable rule on inevitable 
disclosure 
Dummy equal to 1 if a state has ruled in favor of inevitable disclosure.  
Sources: Kahnke et al. 2008, Quinto and Singer 2009, Malsberger 2011, 
Wiesner 2012, Milgrim and Bensen 2013b, Png and Samila 2013, Klasa et 
al. 2014. 
Against rule on inevitable 
disclosure 
Dummy equal to 1 if a state has ruled against inevitable disclosure. 
Sources: Kahnke et al. 2008, Quinto and Singer 2009, Malsberger 2011, 
Wiesner 2012, Milgrim and Bensen 2013b, Png and Samila 2013, Klasa et 
al. 2014. 
Favorable rule on inevitable 
disclosure (Png and Samila 
2013) 
Dummy equal to 1 if a state has ruled in favor of inevitable disclosure.  
Source: Png and Samila 2013. 
Against rule on inevitable 
disclosure (Png and Samila 
2013) 
Dummy equal to 1 if a state has ruled against inevitable disclosure. 
Source: Png and Samila 2013. 
Mixed rule on inevitable 
disclosure (Png and Samila 
2013) 
Dummy equal to 1 if a state has mixed rules or a single ambiguous decision 
on inevitable disclosure.  
Source: Png and Samila 2013. 
State GDP Annual state gross domestic product, in millions of nominal USD. 
Source: BEA. 
New firms The number of firms that have an age of zero years in each state. 
Source: Business Dynamics Statistics. 
UTSA enactment Dummy equal to 1 if a state has enacted the UTSA.  




Non-compete agreement enforceability index (on a scale from 0 to 1), where 
0 equals no enforcement and 1 equals highest possible level of enforcement. 
Sources: Bishara 2010, Garmaise 2011, Bird and Knopf 2014.  
Presidential Election (Red) Dummy equal to 1 if a state has voted for a Republican presidential candidate 
in the last presidential election. Source: www.uselectionatalas.org 
Methodology 
We evaluated the 33-year panel using a state fixed-effects model. Thus, our methodology 
resembles a typical difference-in-difference strategy, through which we compare, for instance, 
whether states that adopted a rule in favor of inevitable disclosure experience a change in VC 
investments, with the changes occurring in states where there has been no rule or there has 
been a rule against. 
Our baseline model, which we used to test hypothesis 1 and which includes year 
dummies to capture idiosyncratic shocks, is as follows: 
ln	 	 , 	 , ,
	ln	 ,   (2.1) 
where i indexes the state and t indexes the year, β the unknown parameter vectors; VC 
investmenti,t is the amount of money invested in a certain state and year in VC deals9; and 
FAVORABLEi,t−1, AGAINSTi,t−1, are the inevitable disclosure rule dummy variables equal to 1 
if a rule clearly in favor or against inevitable disclosure was already enacted in the state and 0 
otherwise. We assume that there exists a one-year lag from the time a court decision is made to 
when it actually has an effect on VC investments. STATEGDPi,t−1 is the log of the state GDP 
control variable,  represents the series of year fixed effects,  represents state fixed effects, 
and  is the error term. Regarding the error term, to account for the presence of serial 
                                                 
9 Since in some states and years the amount of VC investment is equal to 0, we added 1 before taking the 
logarithm. As we use the log of the dependent variable and include year fixed effects, using nominal or real values 
of VC investment does not change our estimates.  
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correlation and to avoid inconsistent standard errors, we clustered observations at the state 
level—the state where companies that receive VC investment are located (Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan, 2004). According to Hypothesis 1, we expect β1 to be significantly positive and 
greater than β2, which means that a favorable rule on inevitable disclosure leads to more VC 
investment, when compared with an against or no rule. 
In our test of Hypothesis 2, the dependent variable is the proportion of VC investment 
by non-local investors. Hence, we adopted the method proposed by Papke and Wooldridge 
(1996) to deal with a regression in which the dependent variable is a fraction and its values are 
bound between 0 and 1. Specifically, they propose a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator 
based on the logistic distribution. This approach has several advantages over alternative 
solutions. First, a linear functional form of the conditional mean might miss important 
nonlinearities. Second, a log-odds transformation fails when the variable falls at the corners. 
Accordingly, we estimate the following model: 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 , 	 f
, , 	ln	 , 	 γ 	 c 	 	 ε 		(2.2) 
We again expect that β1 is positive and greater than β2, which means that a favorable rule on 
inevitable disclosure leads to a higher proportion of non-local VC investment when compared 
with an against or no rule. 
Results 
In Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, we present the summary statistics for the variables used in the 
empirical analysis and their pairwise correlations, respectively. First of all, we found that, as 
expected, equity investment is unevenly distributed across states: California, Massachusetts, 
New York, and Texas account for a large portion of VC investment each year, whereas Alaska 
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and Wyoming report almost no VC investment (Table 2.4). Furthermore, the majority (84%) of 
state-year observations had no rule on inevitable disclosure (Table 2.5). This is because most 
of the inevitable disclosure cases occurred in the mid-1990s to early 2000s, whereas our 
sample period starts in 1981.  
Regression results are shown in Table 2.7. In Model 1, the dependent variable is the log 
of VC equity investment by state-year. In Model 2, the dependent variable is the proportion of 
equity investment by non-local investors in each state-year. Both models include inevitable 
disclosure dummy variables, as well as the GDP variable and state and year fixed effects.  
In Model 1, favorable and against dummies are positive and significant (β1 = 0.605, 
p < 0.01; β2 = 0.266, p < 0.05). Given that the baseline case is represented by those states that 
did not have a clear ruling on inevitable disclosure, we could thus conclude that both a 
favorable rule and a rule against inevitable disclosure increase VC investment compared with 
no rule on the doctrine. In particular, having a rule in favor of inevitable disclosure increases 
VC investment in a state by about 83 percent, whereas a rule against inevitable disclosure 
increases VC investment by 30 percent. A t-test shows that the impact of a favorable rule is 
statistically greater than the impact of a rule against (p < 0.10), which supports Hypothesis 1.  
In Model 2, we find that the decision in favor of inevitable disclosure dummy variable is 
positive and significant (Model 2: β1 = 0.746, p < 0.05), so a favorable rule on inevitable 
disclosure increases the proportion of non-local VC investment. Moreover, a t-test on 
difference in coefficients shows that the impact of a favorable rule is significantly greater than 
the impact of a rule against inevitable disclosure (p < 0.10), which supports Hypothesis 2. 
Since those coefficients were estimated using a non-linear model, we also calculated the 
average marginal effects. In particular, we found that having a rule in favor of inevitable 
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disclosure increases the proportion of VC investment in deals with at least one non-local 
investor by 6 percentage points compared with having no rule on the doctrine. In Models 3 and 
4 we replicate the analyses restricting the sample to only VCs investments from VC funds. The 
results are substantially the same as the baseline models. 
















Alabama 9.40 69.49 40.28 Montana 0.82 3.40 7.43
Alaska 0.35 0.35 0.00 Nebraska 0.40 33.78 16.44
Arizona 31.02 180.10 184.16  Nevada 1.46 17.85 25.91 
Arkansas 0.15 10.03 11.14  New Hampshire 15.68 137.39 137.81 
California 1,237.24 9,362.85 12,982.30  New Jersey 90.91 635.96 759.90 
Colorado 92.08 859.64 649.96  New Mexico 4.48 9.47 41.12 
Connecticut 81.64 374.98 243.98  New York 88.29 1,381.69 1,490.11 
Delaware 1.56 19.09 22.97  North Carolina 21.07 401.15 404.52 
District of Columbia 7.72 112.33 78.00  North Dakota 1.45 2.07 4.53 
Florida 48.13 674.64 413.86  Ohio 37.74 250.54 215.09 
Georgia 54.30 538.74 429.60  Oklahoma 7.48 32.01 27.55 
Hawaii 0.01 24.20 11.85  Oregon 52.89 184.30 162.00 
Idaho 1.53 7.83 14.58  Pennsylvania 67.69 684.92 657.04 
Illinois 51.17 590.52 511.08  Rhode Island 9.28 22.38 62.57 
Indiana 10.42 70.96 85.03  South Carolina 8.52 105.42 45.17 
Iowa 2.49 11.13 23.85  South Dakota 0.23 0.10 3.60 
Kansas 2.83 37.04 42.37  Tennessee 41.15 179.55 101.11 
Kentucky 2.50 45.72 38.93  Texas 193.35 1,384.60 1,428.26 
Louisiana 5.30 51.67 15.41  Utah 11.61 144.03 238.76 
Maine 8.61 25.98 16.68  Vermont 3.54 8.03 21.83 
Maryland 38.70 392.06 598.13  Virginia 39.48 706.37 485.39 
Massachusetts 365.03 2,275.30 3,108.78  Washington 55.96 773.41 825.67 
Michigan 32.61 114.24 146.75  West Virginia 1.54 3.03 8.97 
Minnesota 42.84 273.79 321.26  Wisconsin  10.46 60.92 70.18 
Mississippi 1.38 35.64 9.63  Wyoming 0.21 0.20 1.83 
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Missouri 6.02 206.32 93.15      
Table 2.5 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
VC investment 1,683 368.18 1,767.76 0.00 43,017.95 
VC investment  by VC funds only 1,683 348.87 1,724.89 0.00 42,190.98 
Proportion of VC investments by 
non-local investors 
1,483 0.91 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Proportion of VC investments by 
non-local investors (VC funds 
only) 
1,457 0.90 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Favorable rule on inevitable 
disclosure 
1,683 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Against rule on inevitable 
disclosure 
1,683 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Favorable rule on inevitable 
disclosure (Png and Samila 
2013) 
1,683 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Against rule on inevitable 
disclosure (Png and Samila 
2013) 
1,683 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Mixed rule on inevitable disclosure 
(Png and Samila 2013) 
1,683 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
State GDP 1,683 177,694.69 250,292.10 5,436.00 2,202,678.00 
New firms 1,632 9,557.66 11,214.39 569.00 74,879.00 
UTSA enactment 1,683 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Non-compete enforceability index 1,683 0.36 0.15 0.00 0.75 
Presidential election (Red) 1,683 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
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Table 2.6 Correlations 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 
1. VC investment 1.00              
2. VC investment by VC 
funds only 
1.00*** 1.00             
3. Proportion of VC 
investments by non-
local investors 
-0.10*** -0.10*** 1.00            
4. Proportion of VC 
investments by non-
local investors (VC 
funds only) 
-0.11*** -0.11*** 0.91*** 1.00           
5. Favorable rule on 
inevitable disclosure 
0.06* 0.05* -0.04 -0.05 1.00          
6. Against rule on 
inevitable disclosure 
0.28*** 0.27*** -0.07** -0.07** -0.08** 1.00         
7. Favorable rule on 
inevitable disclosure†  
0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.51*** -0.05* 1.00        
8. Against rule on 
inevitable disclosure†  
0.32*** 0.32*** -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.05* 0.62*** -0.09*** 1.00       
9. Mixed rule on 
inevitable disclosure† 
0.06* 0.06* -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.47*** -0.14*** -0.07** 1.00      
10. State GDP 0.63*** 0.63*** -0.15*** -0.14*** 0.25*** 0.32*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 1.00     
11. New firms 0.49*** 0.49*** -0.11*** -0.09*** 0.13*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.82*** 1.00    
12. UTSA enactment 0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.04 0.06* 0.03 0.02 0.10*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.16*** 1.00   
13. Non-compete 
enforceability index 
-0.20*** -0.20*** 0.01 -0.01 0.08*** -0.04 0.20*** -0.18*** 0.12*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.05* 1.00  
14. Presidential election 
(Red) 
-0.17*** -0.17*** 0.03 0.03 -0.17*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.04 -0.14*** -0.23*** -0.06* -0.18*** -0.06* 1.00 
† Png and Samila 2013. 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
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Table 2.7 Impact of inevitable disclosure on all VC investment and investment by VC funds 
only 
 All VC Investment Investment by VC Funds Only 





Proportion of VC 




Proportion of VC 
investments by non-local 
investors 
Favorable 0.605*** 0.746** 0.565*** 0.594** 
 (0.152) (0.312) (0.195) (0.266) 
Against 0.266** 0.082 0.261** 0.111 
 (0.125) (0.227) (0.129) (0.282) 
ln state GDP (t–1) 1.675*** 1.266 1.583*** 1.487* 
 (0.326) (0.857) (0.342) (0.797) 
Constant -15.762*** -10.119 -14.813*** -12.236 
 (3.377) (8.879) (3.541) (8.264) 
     
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clusters 51 51 51 51 
Observations 1,683 1,483 1,683 1,457 
Adj. R-squared 0.648 − 0.638 − 
Log Likelihood − -314.285 − -331.304 
Notes. OLS regression results in columns (1) and (3), fractional logit regression results in columns (2) and 
(4). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbances are clustered by state. The unit of observation is 
the state-year, and the data cover the 50 U.S. states (and the District of Columbia) from 1981 to 2013. In 
models (1) and (3), the dependent variable is the log of 1 plus VC investment. In models (2) and (4), the 
dependent variable is proportion of VC investments with at least one non-local investor participating in 
the deal. 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
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Beyond the hypotheses tested, another finding is of particular interest. As previously 
stated with regard to Model 1, the coefficient for a rule against inevitable disclosure was 
positive and significant. This suggests that for VC investors the predictability of court 
decisions might obstruct investment decisions more than the possibility of employees leaving. 
However, note that the positive effect of a rule against inevitable disclosure on VC investments 
disappears both when we exclude from our sample California—which ruled against inevitable 
disclosure in 1999—and when we restrict our sample to the period 1991–2013, when in fact all 
decisions in favor of the inevitable disclosure were made (cf. Table 2.8, Models 1 and 3). 
We performed a number of additional analyses to assess the robustness of our results. 
First, when considering the impact of inevitable disclosure ruling on the overall amount of VC 
investments, there could be a concern that the effect of a favorable rule is mediated by an 
increase in entrepreneurship, in that stronger trade secret protection might encourage the entry 
of new companies, which in turn attracts VC investors. To rule out this possible explanation, 
we collected data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Business Dynamics Statistics dataset on the 
number of new firms created in each state from 1981 to 2012 (data on 2013 are not available).  
Table 2.9 shows not only that rulings on inevitable disclosure have no significant effect 
on new firms (column 1) but also that the impact of a rule in favor of inevitable disclosure does 
not substantially change when including the number of new firms as an additional control 
(column 2). These findings support the idea that entrepreneurship does not mediate the effect 
of inevitable disclosure rulings on VC investment. 
Some longitudinal changes in the institutional environment could confound the impact 
of inevitable disclosure rulings. For instance, variations in non-compete covenants might  
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Table 2.8 Impact of inevitable disclosure: excluding California and restricting the sample 
to 1991-2013 
 Excluding California 1991-2013 





Proportion of VC 




Proportion of VC 
investments by non-local 
investors 
Favorable 0.607*** 0.734** 0.437** 0.751** 
 (0.151) (0.313) (0.179) (0.314) 
Against 0.220 0.122 0.143 0.111 
 (0.134) (0.315) (0.164) (0.315) 
ln state GDP (t–1) 1.686*** 1.345 0.839 2.269* 
 (0.327) (0.862) (0.506) (1.372) 
Constant -15.887*** -10.966 -7.002 -22.650 
 (3.376) (8.945) (5.584) (15.318) 
     
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clusters 50 50 51 51 
Observations 1,650 1,450 1,173 1,068 
Adj. R-squared 0.642 − 0.504 − 
Log Likelihood − -301.991 − -225.272 
Notes. OLS regression results in columns (1) and (3), fractional logit regression results in columns (2) and 
(4). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbances are clustered by state. The unit of observation is the 
state-year, and the data cover all U.S. states but California in columns (1) and (2) and all U.S. states from 
1991 to 2013 in column (3) and (4). In models (1) and (3), the dependent variable is the log of 1 plus VC 
investment. In models (2) and (4), the dependent variable is proportion of VC investments with at least one 
non-local investor participating in the deal. 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
 
influence the extent to which VC investors want to invest in a region and, at the same time, might 
be the extent to which VC investors want to invest in a region and, at the same time, might be 
correlated with variations in inevitable disclosure rulings. To address this issue, we also control for 
non-compete enforceability in each state by using the Garmaise Noncompetition Enforceability 
Index (Garmaise, 2011). Because the index is restricted to the period 1992–2004 , we combined it  
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Table 2.9 Impact of inevitable disclosure on the number of new firms and VC controlling 
for new firmsa 
 (1) (2) 
Variable ln new firms ln VC investment 
ln new firms  0.133 
  (0.363) 
Favorable 0.086 0.587*** 
 (0.052) (0.147) 
Against 0.021 0.250* 
 (0.032) (0.126) 
ln state GDP (t–1) 0.708*** 1.562*** 
 (0.102) (0.515) 
Constant 1.244 -15.724*** 
 (1.060) (3.288) 
   
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clusters 51 51 
Observations 1,632 1,632 
Adj. R-squared 0.667 0.653 
 
a Data on the number of new firms are available until 2012. 
Notes. OLS regression results are shown, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbances are 
clustered by state. The unit of observation is the state-year, and the data cover the 50 U.S. states (and 
the District of Columbia) from 1981 to 2012. In Model (1), the dependent variable is the log of new 
firms. In Model (2), the dependent variable is the log of 1 plus VC investment. 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
 
 
with the Bird Noncompetition Enforceability Index, which provides data for the period 1976–
1994 (Bird and Knopf, 2014).10 At the same time, the enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act (UTSA) in 47 states between 1981 and 2012 might also correlate with the state court 
position on the inevitable disclosure doctrine. To provides data for the period 
                                                 
10 Although the majority of state index scores matched in overlapping years (1992–1994), five states did not have 
matching values (Connecticut, Hawaii, Minnesota, South Dakota, and West Virginia). For each of these states, the 
Bird Index value was constant throughout the period 1976–1994. Therefore, we replaced the Bird Index value 
with the Garmaise Index value to provide consistency across data sets. Finally, based on Bishara (2010), we 
considered that no major changes in non-compete enforceability occurred over the last decade and extended the 
Garmaise Index values from 2004 to 2012, keeping each value constant for each state.  
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1976–1994 (Bird and Knopf, 2014).11 At the same time, the enactment of the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act (UTSA) in 47 states between 1981 and 2012 might also correlate with the state 
court position on the inevitable disclosure doctrine. To control for the enactment of the UTSA, 
we therefore include a variable equal to 1 after the year of enactment in a certain state and 0 
otherwise (Milgrim and Bensen, 2013a; Png, 2014). Appendix Table 2.A2 lists the states that 
have enacted the UTSA, along with the year of enactment. Table 2.10 provides alternative 
specifications that include measures of non-compete enforceability and UTSA adoption. 
Results show that both hypotheses are upheld. 
 The validity of our empirical results relies on the assumption that decisions in favor of 
or against inevitable disclosure are exogenous, conditional on the control variables included in 
the regressions. As these decisions represent court rulings about specific cases and are not 
aimed at enacting general policies for attracting VC, we believe this assumption is reasonable. 
However, to more rigorously test this assumption, we run two OLS regressions predicting 
whether a court state will rule in favor of or against inevitable disclosure. Based on Pe’er and 
Gottschalg (2011), one could for instance argue that Republican (“Red”) states are more likely 
to not only enact policies attracting VC (such as for instance lowering tax rates on capital 
gains), but also to select pro-VC oriented judges. However, Table 2.11 indicates that a state 
Republican orientation as evident in the last presidential election12, does not affect the court 
ruling on inevitable disclosure cases. We also find that the lagged amount of VC investment in
                                                 
11 Although the majority of state index scores matched in overlapping years (1992–1994), five states did not have 
matching values (Connecticut, Hawaii, Minnesota, South Dakota, and West Virginia). For each of these states, the 
Bird Index value was constant throughout the period 1976–1994. Therefore, we replaced the Bird Index value 
with the Garmaise Index value to provide consistency across data sets. Finally, based on Bishara (2010), we 
considered that no major changes in non-compete enforceability occurred over the last decade and extended the 
Garmaise Index values from 2004 to 2012, keeping each value constant for each state.  
12 This is the measure of political orientation used in Pe´er and Gottschalg (2011). Using the presence of a Red 
Governor as proxy of the state political orientation does not change the results. 











Proportion of  
VC investments by 
non-local investors
(5) 
Proportion of  
VC investments by 
non-local investors
(6) 
Proportion of VC 
investments by 
non-local investors 
.603*** 0.601*** 0.598*** 0.741** 0.747** 0.740** 
(0.152) (0.145) (0.145) (0.302) (0.322) (0.313) 
0.276** 0.248* 0.259** 0.105 0.085 0.102 
(0.115) (0.126) (0.116) (0.224) (0.233) (0.231) 
-0.591  -0.602 -3.682  -3.686* 
(0.652)  (0.634) (2.240)  (2.228) 
 -0.101 -0.103  0.010 -0.012 
 (0.091) (0.092)  (0.253) (0.244) 
.653*** 1.683*** 1.660*** 0.999 1.265 0.999 
(0.331) (0.324) (0.330) (0.804) (0.860) (0.807) 
15.326 -15.845 -15.402 -5.845 -10.098 -5.857* 
(3.466) (3.364) (3.451) (8.328) (8.935) (8.391) 
      
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
51 51 51 51 51 51 
1,683 1,683 1,683 1,483 1,483 1,483 
0.648 0.648 0.648 − − − 
− − − -313.552 -314.285 -313.552 
n results are shown, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbances are clustered by state. The unit of observation is 
r the 50 U.S. states (and the District of Columbia) from 1981 to 2013. In models (1)–(3), the dependent variable is the log of 1 
4)–(6), the dependent variable is the proportion of VC investments with at least one non-local investor participating in the 
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the state does not affect the court position on inevitable disclosure. These findings corroborate 
our assumption on the exogeneity of the court decisions. 
A further challenge to the difference-in-difference approach is that differential changes 
between states in favor of inevitable disclosure and the other states may be determined by pre-
ruling difference in the time trend of dependent variables (that is, the amount of VC invested in a 
state, on one side, and the proportion of VC investment by non-local investors, on the other side). 
To tackle this issue, following Moser and Voena (2012), we check whether there existed any 
positive time trend in states in favor of inevitable disclosure even before they ruled. In particular, 
for states that did not rule on inevitable disclosure we include all observations, whereas for states 
that ruled in favor of inevitable disclosure we include just the observations before the year of 
rulings and we estimate the following equations:   
ln	 	 , 	 , ∗
	 ln	 , , ,  (2.3) 
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 , f
, ∗ ln , 	γ 	 c
	ε , 		 1.4   
where  is a year trend variable and ,  is a variable equal to 1 for 
the states ruling in favor of inevitable disclosure (during the period before the actual ruling 
occurs). If there is no pre-existing time trend in the state in favor of inevitable disclosure, then 
	should not be significantly different from zero in both (3) and (4). Results in Table 2.12 show 
in fact that no pre-existing positive time trend affects our previous findings about the positive 
impact of a rule in favor of inevitable disclosure on the amount of VC investments and on the 
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Table 2.11 Predictors of decisions in favor of or against inevitable disclosure 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Favorable Against 
Presidential election (Red)  -0.000 
  (0.005) 
ln VC investment (t–1) 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
ln state GDP (t–1) -0.005 0.012 
 (0.011) (0.010) 
Constant 0.056 -0.132 
 (0.117) (0.106) 
   
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Clusters 51 48 
Observations 1,604 1,496 
Adj. R-squared 0.007 0.007 
Notes. OLS regression results in columns (1) and (2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Disturbances are clustered by state. The unit of observation is the state-year, and the data cover the 50 
U.S. states (and the District of Columbia) from 1981 to 2013 for states that did not rule on ID, and up to 
the year of decision for the states that ruled in favor or against. 




proportion of VC investments by non-local investors (cf. Table 2.7).  
Another potential concern relates to the findings about the proportion of non-local VC 
investments. One could argue that because several states are provided with limited local VC 
endowment (not enough to satisfy the demand of local start-ups), any factor increasing VC 
investments in a state would naturally increase the non-local investment component more than 
the local investment component, as the latter tends to be exhausted before the former. To address 
this issue, we measured the extent to which a state is endowed with local VC that could 
potentially serve local start-ups as the ratio between VC investments made by local VC firms 
outside the state and the number of local start-ups. Then, we assess the effect of inevitable 
disclosure rules on two different subsamples composed respectively by a) those states that are 
provided with a relatively large amount of local VC compared with the needs of the internal 
start-ups, for which the previously defined ratio is equal or above the median value of the ratio in 
a certain year (Table 2.13, column 2); and b) those states that instead are provided with a 
relatively low amount of local VC compared with the needs of the internal start-ups, for which 
the value of the ratio is below the median  (Table 2.13, column 1). The impact of a rule in favor 
of inevitable disclosure on the proportion of non-local investments is positive in both 
subsamples, which indicates that our findings also hold for those states provided with a large 








Table 2.12 Potential trends in the states in favor of inevitable disclosure 
 (1) (2) 
Variable ln VC 
investment 
Proportion of VC investments 
by non-local investors 
Year trend -0.018 -0.127** 
 (0.020) (0.055) 
Pre-favorable * Year trend 0.021 0.024 
 (0.018) (0.049) 
ln state GDP (t–1) 1.723*** 1.911** 
 (0.339) (0.865) 
Constant 16.286 234.034** 
 (36.317) (101.078) 
   
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Clusters 51 51 
Observations 1,604 1,496 
Adj. R-squared 0.622 − 
Log likelihood − -292.391 
Notes. OLS regression results in columns (1) and (2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbances 
are clustered by state. The unit of observation is the state-year, and the data cover the 50 U.S. states (and 
the District of Columbia) from 1981 to 2013 for states that did not rule on ID, and up to the year of 
decision for the states that ruled in favor. In Model (1), the dependent variable is the log of 1 plus VC 
investment. In Model (2), the dependent variable is the proportion of VC investments with at least one 
non-local investor participating in the deal.  





Table 2.13 Impact of inevitable disclosure on VC investment with high local VC and low 
VC state subsamples 
 Low Local VC states High Local VC states 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Proportion of VC investments by 
non-local investors 
Proportion of VC investments by 
non-local investors 
Favorable 1.034* 0.458* 
 (0.528) (0.257) 
Against -1.877*** 0.062 
 (0.678) (0.176) 
ln state GDP (t–1) 3.167 1.040 
 (2.003) (0.889) 
Constant -31.416 -6.808 
 (20.879) (9.401) 
   
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clusters 39 50 
Observations 626 857 
Log likelihood -98.075 -196.543 
Note. Fractional logit regression results are shown, with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Disturbances are clustered by state. The unit of observation is the state-year, and the data cover the 50 
U.S. states (and the District of Columbia) from 1981 to 2013. The dependent variable is proportion of VC 
investments with at least one non-local investor participating in the deal. 




Finally, we ran tests to evaluate how robust the models were to variations in our measure 
of inevitable disclosure ruling. Specifically, we checked whether the results change adopting the 
inevitable disclosure measure of Png and Samila (2013) and codifying the measure using dummy 
variables (i.e., favorable, against, and mixed). Indeed, although we are significantly indebted to 
Png and Samila (2013) for the construction of our measure, our coding criteria differ in that we 
(1) consider a state to be in favor of inevitable disclosure only when it is clear that the doctrine 
would be applied to restrict employee mobility regardless of the existence of a non-compete 
agreement, (2) do not consider mixed decisions (i.e., decisions that do not clarify the state 
positions on inevitable disclosure) to be precedential, and (3) consider a newer rule, only if a 
higher court strikes down the precedent, thereby overruling (rather than simply distinguishing 























Table 2.14 Impact of inevitable disclosure on VC investment using Png and Samila’s (2013) 
inevitable disclosure measure 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Ln VC investment Proportion of VC investments by 
non-local investors 
Favorable 0.457* 0.446* 
 (0.122) (0.239) 
Against 0.387*** -0.331 
 (0.107) (0.242) 
Mixed 0.299** 0.135 
 (0.146) (0.213) 
ln state GDP (t–1) 1.717*** 1.383 
 (0.318) (0.869) 
Constant -16.234*** -11.356 
 (3.299) (9.000) 
   
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clusters 51 51 
Observations 1,683 1,483 
Adj. R-squared 0.648 − 
Log likelihood − -314.572 
Notes. OLS regression results in column (1), fractional logit regression results in column (2). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Disturbances are clustered by state. The unit of observation is the state-
year, and the data cover the 50 U.S. states (and the District of Columbia) from 1981 to 2013. In Model 
(1), the dependent variable is the log of 1 plus VC investment. In Model (2), the dependent variable is the 
proportion of VC investments with at least one non-local investor participating in the deal. 




Discussion and Conclusion 
Most of the literature on IPR and VC has focused on patents (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013; Mann and 
Sager, 2007). However, far less is known about the impact of trade secret protection on VC. In 
this paper, we focus specifically on the inevitable disclosure doctrine, a strong form of trade 
secret protection. By exploiting a longitudinal variation in inevitable disclosure rule in the United 
States, we show that the extent to which inevitable disclosure doctrine is embraced in a 
jurisdiction affects not only the overall amount of VC investment but also the proportion of VC 
investment by non-local investors. Specifically, we show that, compared with having no rule, a 
rule in favor of inevitable disclosure increases VC investment in a state by 83 percent, whereas a 
rule against inevitable increases VC investment by 30 percent. Furthermore, having a rule in 
favor of inevitable disclosure increases the proportion of VC investment in deals with at least 
one non-local investor by 6 percent compared with having no rule on the doctrine. 
We believe this research contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, it 
contributes to the literature on the impact of institutions on investment (Lerner and Tåg, 2013; 
Pe’er and Gottschalg, 2011; Taussig and Delios, 2014). In particular, it extends previous 
literature on institutions and VC investment by suggesting that IPR protection might be 
important in solving two different types of uncertainty faced by VC investors. On one hand, it 
might affect knowledge spillover uncertainty, that is, the risk of knowledge leakages, due for 
instance to the mobility of key employees. This type of uncertainty has been extensively 
analyzed by previous research on IPR protection and VC (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013; Mann and 
Sager, 2007). On the other hand, the rule on IPR protection also affects regulatory uncertainty, 
that is, predictability of court decision on IPR cases. In this respect, the finding that a clear rule 
(a rule in favor or against) on inevitable disclosure is generally preferred by investors to an 
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unclear rule resonates with the Coasian argument that an institutional environment providing a 
clear definition of property rights always leads to the socially efficient outcome regardless of the 
initial allocation of those rights (Coase, 1960). Yet, the finding related to a rule against inevitable 
disclosure should not be overemphasized, as it is largely driven by a single state (i.e., California). 
Second, this work extends the literature on the role of trade secrets as an important IPR 
protection mechanism that affects entrepreneurial ecosystems. Previous literature has already 
shown that trade secret protection increases firm profits and stimulates clustering (Fosfuri and 
Rønde, 2004), encourages R&D investment (Png, 2014), and decreases labor mobility (Png, 
2012). In this study, we find that the protection of trade secrets through the adoption of the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine plays a role in attracting VC investment, reinforcing the idea that a 
form of trade secret protection, namely that of inevitable disclosure, may play an important role 
in the entrepreneurial environment of a region and, ultimately, in its economic growth. 
Third, our research contributes to the literature on the effect of employer-friendly labor 
regulations on innovation and entrepreneurship (e.g., Garmaise, 2011; Marx et al., 2009; Stuart 
and Sorenson, 2003). Previous studies have found that the factors that limit the mobility of 
employees—such as non-compete agreements—negatively affect entrepreneurship (Samila and 
Sorenson, 2011b). However, we show that the inevitable disclosure doctrine—which might also 
severely limit employee mobility—increases the level of VC investment, which is seen as an 
important instrument to support entrepreneurial growth firms. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that different legal means, such as inevitable disclosure and non-competes, both of which 




As with any empirical study, this work has limitations. First, a shortcoming of our study 
is that the database we use for retrieving information on VC, VentureXpert, does not report VC 
investment amounts for each individual investor, but only for each deal. Therefore, although we 
can measure the proportion of VC investment with at least one non-local investor, we cannot 
measure the amount of money invested in a firm by non-local VC investors. Future studies 
should try to develop also this second measure of the presence of non-local VC investors. 
Another limitation is that we were unable to sort out whether the positive relationship between a 
favorable rule on inevitable disclosure and VC investments was due mainly to an increase in the 
probability of obtaining a court injunction limiting employee mobility or to a decrease in the 
predictability of such injunction. Future research, such as a survey to VC investors, should seek 
to disentangle these two mechanisms and their effects on VC investment. 
Despite these limitations, our study might have important managerial and policy-making 
implications. With a better understanding of how to attract VC, entrepreneurs might pursue 
pertinent strategies for reducing uncertainty and, in so doing, receive more funding. For instance, 
entrepreneurs who live in regions that have rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine should 
seek to leverage social ties and build trust, to decrease the possibility of employee departure, and 
thereby try to mitigate concerns that VCs might have when deciding on their investments. 
Additionally, entrepreneurs could require their company employees to sign non-compete 
agreements, in order to reduce VCs’ uncertainty concerning employee departure. Of course, 
another option would be to relocate to states where the doctrine has not been rejected. 
From a policy-maker perspective, we show whether and to what extent the enactment of 
laws protecting trade secrets by regulating employee mobility might affect the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. In this respect, future studies should attempt to capture the effect of inevitable 
45 
 
disclosure on economic performance, both at the deal level—for instance, by the internal rate of 
return of an investment—and at the firm level—for example, by evaluating the job creation of 
VC-backed companies in those states where the inevitable disclosure doctrine is adopted. 
Analyzing different outcomes would provide a more nuanced picture of the impact of trade 
secret protection on different stakeholders (VC firms, start-ups, customers, etc.). Assessing the 






















Measure of state inevitable disclosure rule  
In codifying the sentences, we used the following criteria: 
Decisions in favor. We defined a favorable decision on inevitable disclosure to be a decision that 
recognized the applicability of the doctrine for preventing an employee to move to a rival without 
requiring an accompanying non-compete agreement. For example, the prominent Illinois case PepsiCo, 
Inc. v. Redmond is a clear instance of a favorable decision on inevitable disclosure.13 William Redmond 
Jr. sought to leave PepsiCo for Quaker, a competitor, but was prohibited from doing so on the basis that 
his new employment would “inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s [PepsiCo’s] trade secrets.” 
Decision against. We defined an against decision as a decision that clearly rejected the possibility to 
restrict employee mobility to a competitor based on the inevitable disclosure doctrine, where there is also 
the absence of a non-compete agreement and actual misappropriation. For instance, in the Louisiana case 
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Walter T. Zumpe et al., Standards Brands sought to enjoin a former employee 
from working for a competitor in the coffee and tea business.14 The court decided that “absent disclosure 
or imminent threat of disclosure, injunction should not be granted.” 
Unclear decision. We define an unclear decision—which is the equivalent of having no rule—as a 
decision that may acknowledge the existence of the doctrine but does not clarify its scope and conditions 
of applicability. An example of unclear decision is given by the Connecticut case Branson Ultrasonics 
Corp. v. Stratman.15 The court accepted the inevitable disclosure doctrine only as a reinforcement of a 
non-compete agreement but did not clarify whether the inevitable disclosure doctrine would have been 
applied in the absence of a non-compete covenant. 
  
                                                 
13 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) 
14 Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe et al., 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967) 
15 Branson Ultrasonics Corp. v. Stratman, 921 F. Supp. 909 (D. Conn. 1996) 
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Table 2.15 Inevitable disclosure precedent and rule measure 
State  Year  Case  Decision Rule  
California  1999 Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Systems, 
Inc, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1112 (N.D. Cal 
1999). 
“The Court holds that California trade-secrets law does not 
recognize the theory of inevitable disclosure; indeed, such a rule 
would run counter to the strong public policy in California favoring 
employee mobility.” 
Against 
Florida 2001 Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole 
Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 
2001). 
“A court should not allow a plaintiff to use inevitable disclosure as 
an after-the-fact non-compete agreement to enjoin an employee 
from working for the employer of his or her choice.” 
Against 
Illinois 1995 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 
1272 (7th Cir. 1995). 
“We affirm the district court’s order enjoining Redmond from 
assuming his responsibilities at Quaker through May, 1995, and 
“preventing him forever from disclosing PCNA trade secrets and 
confidential information.” 
Favorable 
Iowa  2002 Barilla America, Inc. v. Wright, No. 4–
02-CV-90267, 2002 WL. 31165069 (S.D. 
Iowa Jul. 5, 2002). 
“The Court will also craft the injunction broadly, enjoining Wright 
from taking any position in the pasta industry, so as to prevent any 
incentive, financial or otherwise, to disclose trade secret 
information.” 
Favorable 
Louisiana  1967 Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe et al., 264 
F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967).  
The court stated, “while it does not appear here that the disclosure 
of confidential information by [the defendant] will inevitably result 
from his employment by [a competitor], even if this were the 
consequence, no remedy could be afforded.” The court cited 
Louisiana’s statutory prohibition on non-compete agreements and 
strong public policy of free labor. 
Against 
Maryland  2004 LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 849 
A.2d 451, 471 (Md. 2004). 
“The chief ill in the covenant not to compete imposed by the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine is in its after-the-fact nature: The 
covenant is imposed after the employment contract is made and 
therefore alters the employment relationship without the 
employee’s consent.” 
Against 
Massachusetts 1995 Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles 47 F.3d 467, 
472 (1st Cir. 1995). 
The court states that an injunction blocking the employee cannot be 
granted, since “the public interest tilted in Giles’ [the defendant] 





State  Year  Case  Decision Rule  
Minnesota  1992 International Business Machine Corp. v. 
Seagate Technology Inc. 941 F. Supp. 98 
(D. Minn. 1992). 
“In the absence of a covenant not to compete or a finding of actual 
or an intent to disclose trade secrets, employees ‘may pursue their 
chosen field of endeavor in direct competition’ with their prior 
employer.” 
Against 
New Jersey  1980 Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chem. 
Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980).  
“Risk of harm if information is inadvertently disclosed, however, is 
not sufficient to satisfy the standard for granting a preliminary 
injunction.” 
Against 
New York  1997 DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 
116914/97, 1997 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 577 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Nov. 7, 1997). 
“Defendants are enjoined, for a period of six months from the date 
of this opinion, from launching any company, or taking 
employment with any company, which competes with 
DoubleClick.” 
Favorable 
North Carolina 1976 Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 
478, 483 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976). 
“North Carolina courts have never enjoined an employee from 
working for a competitor merely to prevent disclosure of 
confidential information. We approve and affirm only that part of 
the preliminary injunction which enjoins the defendant Turner from 
revealing, and the defendant Cutter from seeking to obtain any 
confidential information concerning the modification of the 
Westphalia centrifuge by plaintiff Travenol.” 
Against 
Pennsylvania  2010 Bimbo Bakeries USA Inc. v. Botticella, 
No. 10-cv-00194 (E.D. Penn. Feb. 9, 
2010). 
“We are satisfied that there is a substantial likelihood that 
Defendant will not be able to perform his duties at Hostess and will 
not perform those duties without disclosing, whether intentionally 
or inadvertently, Bimbo’s trade secrets.” 
Favorable 
Utah  1998 Novell, Inc. v. Timpanogos Research 
Group, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197 (Utah 
Dist. Ct. 1998).  
“I have found that it is inevitable that defendants will traffic upon 
Novell’s trade secrets and confidential technical information unless 
they are restrained from being in the same business Novell is in.” 
Favorable 
Virginia  1999 Government Technology Services, Inc. v. 
Intellisys Technology Corp., 51 Va. Cir. 
55 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 20, 1999).  
The court stated that Virginia does not recognize the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine. 
Against 
Washington  1997 Solutec Corp, Inc. v. Agnew, 1997 WL 
794496, 8 (Wash. Ct. App.). 
“The courts recognize that in some situations a broad injunction for 
a limited period is the only effective remedy to a threatened trade 
secrets violation.” 
Favorable 




Table 2.16 Enactment of statutes conforming to UTSA 
State Year of enactment  State Year of enactment 
Alaska 1988  Montana 1985 
Arizona 1990  Nebraska 1988 
Arkansas 1981  Nevada 1987 
California 1985  New Hampshire 1990 
Colorado 1986  New Jersey 2012 
Connecticut 1983  New Mexico 1989 
Delaware 1982  North Carolina 1981 
District of Columbia 1989  North Dakota 1983 
Florida 1988  Ohio 1994 
Georgia 1990  Oklahoma 1986 
Hawaii 1989  Oregon 1988 
Idaho 1981  Pennsylvania 2004 
Illinois 1988  Rhode Island 1986 
Indiana 1982  South Carolina 1992 
Iowa 1990  South Dakota 1988 
Kansas 1981  Tennessee 2000 
Kentucky 1990  Utah 1989 
Louisiana 1981  Vermont 1996 
Maine 1987  Virginia 1986 
Maryland 1989  Washington 1982 
Michigan 1998  West Virginia 1986 
Minnesota 1981  Wisconsin 1986 
Mississippi 1990  Wyoming 2006 
Missouri 1995    




3 Learning to Do What? How Acquisition Experience Affects 
Learning to Select and Add Value in Private Equity-Backed 
Buyouts16 
Abstract 
We extend experiential learning theory by arguing that the degree of causal ambiguity in firm 
decisions likely differs not only across different settings (i.e. operational vs. strategic), but also 
across different stages of the same strategic decision. With particular regard to acquisitions, 
we argue that the selection stage is less causally ambiguous than is the restructuring stage. 
Since experience translates into learning to a lesser extent when causal ambiguity is greater, 
acquisition experience translates more readily into learning to select than into learning to add 
value. Accordingly, we hypothesize that more experienced acquirers should perform better in 
scenarios when the focal acquisition is more selection (rather than restructuring) oriented, such 
as when (1) the educational background of the acquiring firm’s top management is more 
finance (rather than business) oriented; and (2) the information environment is less transparent. 
Drawing on a unique database of 946 acquisitions realized by private equity firms in the US 
between 1976 and 2005, we find results that are largely consistent with our notion that the 
correlation between acquisition experience and performance is more positive when the firm’s 
capacity to select target companies is more relevant. 
Introduction 
The goal of understanding how accumulated experience affects performance has taken center stage 
in the discourse between organizational and strategy scholars. Considerable research in operational 
settings has offered robust evidence of a positive impact of experience on performance (Argote 
and Epple, 1990; Dutton and Thomas, 1984; Yelle, 1979), but vast literature in strategic contexts 
                                                 
16 Submitted for review as: Castellaneta, F., Conti, R., and Kemeny, C. Learning to Do What? How Acquisition 
Experience Affects Learning to Select and Add Value in Private Equity-Backed Buyouts. 
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– such as mergers and acquisitions (M&As), which account for most research conducted in this 
field – has provided decidedly mixed results (e.g., Barkema and Schijven, 2008a; Laamanen and 
Keil, 2008). To explain this inconsistency, it has been argued that learning from experience in 
strategic contexts is far more difficult than in operational settings, due to the higher level of causal 
ambiguity characterizing decisions in the context of the former than in the latter (March and Olsen, 
1975; Zollo, 2009). That is, it is more difficult to determine precisely the causal relationships 
between decisions and their outcomes in strategic contexts based solely on accumulated experience 
about those decisions (Mosakowski, 1997).  
In this paper, we extend experiential learning theory by arguing that the degree of causal 
ambiguity is likely to differ not only between decisions in different settings (i.e., operational vs. 
strategic), but also across different stages of the same strategic decision (such as, for instance, an 
acquisition). Therefore, the translation of experience into learning may vary substantially across 
such stages. In fact, with particular regard to acquisitions, we might identify two distinct stages, 
both of which contribute to determining final performance. On the one hand, at the selection stage, 
the acquirer tries to reduce the information asymmetry gap between itself and a potential target 
firm, in order to assess the latter’s real value (Capron and Shen, 2007; Puranam, Powell, and Singh, 
2006). On the other hand, at the restructuring stage, the acquirer tries instead to increase the target’s 
actual value through corporate reorganization (Barkema and Schijven, 2008a; Heimeriks, 
Schijven, and Gates, 2012). 
We argue that the restructuring stage is more causally ambiguous than the selection stage, 
for (at least) two reasons. First, it is relatively more complex because it is composed of a higher 
number of more interrelated activities (King, 2007). Second, in comparison with the selection 
stage, the outcome of the restructuring stage tends to be more delayed (King, 2007). When 
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organizations face causal ambiguity problems, experience translates into learning to a lesser extent 
(March and Olsen, 1975). Thus, acquisition experience should translate more into learning about 
how best to select targets than about how to restructure. If so, we should observe that more 
experienced acquirers perform particularly well when acquisition performance depends more 
heavily on the proper execution of the selection stage rather than of the restructuring one.  
We apply our conceptual arguments to a context that is particularly well suited to 
discriminating between value created in these two stages: acquisitions – also called buyouts – 
performed by financial acquirers such as private equity (PE) firms (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). 
Such firms can generate value by selecting targets with high potential for financial arbitrage, that 
is, those targets priced below their current standalone value (i.e., deploying a buy low, sell high 
strategy). Or they can create value once the target company has been acquired, by increasing the 
target’s operational effectiveness (e.g., by cutting costs and improving margins) or its strategic 
distinctiveness (e.g., through redefining key strategic variables).  
Against this background, we hypothesize that, since acquisition experience translates more 
into learning to select than to restructure, more experienced PE firms should perform better in any 
situation where the proper execution of the selection stage is more important than that of the 
subsequent restructuring state – i.e., when the focal acquisition is more selection (as opposed to 
restructuring) oriented. In fact, whereas all acquisitions are likely to be constituted of both a 
selection and a restructuring phase, the relative importance of those two phases for the overall 
value created throughout the acquisition process likely differs across different deals. Thus, any 
acquisition is selection or restructuring oriented, according to whether selection or restructuring is 
the more important source of value creation. The extent to which an acquisition is selection (as 
opposed to restructuring) oriented is likely determined by: a) the internal human resources the PE 
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firm is provided with and b) the external environment where it operates.  
As for the corporate resources, we focus on firm level human capital and, in particular, on 
the type of educational background possessed by the acquiring firm’s top management. A firm’s 
acquisition strategy is influenced by top managers’ cognitive bases and skills, which are in turn 
affected by the type of education that top managers have received (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
Hitt and Tyler, 1991; Hitt et al., 2001a). In this respect, we argue that top managers with a finance 
education background are more likely to pursue selection-oriented acquisition (Andrews and 
Welbourne, 2000; Daellenbach, McCarthy, and Schoenecker, 1999), on which therefore the 
positive impact of acquisition experience is more salient. In contrast, top managers with a general 
business education background are more likely to pursue restructuring-oriented acquisitions 
(Daellenbach et al., 1999; Hay and Hodgkinson, 2008; Sturges, Simpson, and Altman, 2003), on 
which the positive impact of experience is less relevant.  
As for the external environment, based on the strategic factor market literature (Barney, 
1986), we focus on the extent to which the acquiring firms face a transparent environment where 
the information about target firms is homogenous and available to all potential acquirers. The more 
transparent the information environment is, the lower the possibility of creating value by selecting 
target firms which are erroneously undervalued by other potential acquirers – that is, the lower the 
possibility of any acquisition being selection oriented (Capron and Shen, 2007). Hence, experience 
is less crucial for the performance of acquisitions realized in more transparent information 
environments. 
Drawing on a unique database of 946 buyouts realized in the United States between 1976 
and 2005, we find results largely consistent with the notion that acquisition experience enhances 
performance when the acquirer’s capacity to select target companies is more relevant. 
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Accordingly, our study makes several contributions. First, we advance previous experiential 
learning literature by arguing that the degree of causal ambiguity not only varies across different 
decisions – i.e., operational vs. strategic (Mosakowski, 1997; Zollo, 2009) – but also across 
different stages of the same decision – i.e., selection vs. restructuring. Second, we uncover the 
mechanisms through which experience can create value in acquisitions (Haleblian et al., 2009), 
arguing that acquisition experience mainly translates into learning to select, and hence enhances 
acquisition performance in contingencies where selection is relatively more important than 
restructuring. Finally, our results may also contribute to solving the empirical puzzle of the role of 
experience in acquisitions (Barkema and Schijven, 2008b). More specifically, our findings suggest 
that acquisition experience can have a positive impact on acquisition performance in settings where 
selection is more important than restructuring, and no impact (or even a negative impact) in settings 
where instead restructuring is more important than selection.  
Background 
The issue of whether experience affects performance has been on the organizational research 
agenda for decades. Previous studies have consistently theorized and shown that performance 
increases as organizations gain production experience in operational settings, findings which have 
been documented, for example, in the production of aircraft (Alchian, 1963; Benkard, 2000; 
Wright, 1936), ships (Rapping, 1965), trucks (Argote and Epple, 1990), and semiconductors 
(Hatch and Mowery, 1998).  
However, the literature’s findings on learning from experience in strategic contexts are 
decidedly mixed (Barkema and Schijven, 2008b). Some studies about alliances have shown 
positive relationships between alliance experience and performance (Anand and Khanna, 2000), 
while others find inverted U-shaped relationships (Deeds and Hill, 1996; Hoang and Rothaermel, 
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2005). Similarly, in the acquisitions literature – which is the focus of this paper – some studies 
have found positive relationships between acquisition experience and performance (Barkema, 
Bell, and Pennings, 1996; Bruton, Oviatt, and White, 1994; Fowler and Schmidt, 1989), but other 
contributions have reported non-significant (Hayward, 2002; Kroll et al., 1997; Newbould, Stray, 
and Wilson, 1976; Wright et al., 2002; Zollo and Singh, 2004) or U-shaped relationships 
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Porrini, 2004). 
To explain the different impacts of experience on performance in strategic versus operational 
contexts, previous research has suggested that experiential learning from strategic decisions (and, 
in particular, from acquisitions) is far more difficult than learning from operational tasks, due to 
the different levels of causal ambiguity characterizing these two settings. Causal ambiguity refers 
to the difficulty of determining precisely the causal relationships between a decision and its 
outcomes (Mosakowski, 1997). As the previous literature shows – assuming decision makers’ 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1947) – causal ambiguity depends mainly on two characteristics of 
the decision at hand.  
First, the cause-effect linkages between a decision and its outcomes can be obscured by the 
complexity of the decision itself – that is, by the numbers of activities involved in the decision and 
the degree of their interdependence (Zollo and Winter, 2002). These two factors are in fact the key 
parameters of complexity as defined in the ‘NK’ models (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). An 
increase in either the number of activities or their interdependence naturally increases uncertainty 
about which specific activities determine final outcomes, and so harms experiential learning. In 
turn, the degree of interdependence likely depends on the type of relationship among the activities 
involved in the decision. As Puranam and Goetting (2011) point out, building on Thompson 
(1967)’s classic typology, interdependence is null when each activity contributes independently to 
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overall performance; it is medium when activities are sequential such that the output of one activity 
constitutes the input of the other activity; and it is highest when activities are reciprocal such that 
the input of one activity constitutes the output of the other activity and vice versa.  
 Second, the length of time needed before the outcome of a decision or action can be 
observed also increases the level of causal ambiguity: that is, “a long time interval between a 
competency execution and its outcome limits opportunities for performance assessment. In 
addition, longer time gaps may raise decision makers’ propensity to engage in self-serving 
attributions that can distort more accurate assessments of competency-performance relationships” 
(King, 2007: 170).  
We suggest that the degree of causal ambiguity likely differs not only across settings (i.e. 
operational vs. strategic), but also across different stages of the same strategic decision. As noted 
above, acquisitions entail two different stages: selection and restructuring. The selection stage 
mainly consists of engaging in a systematic search and collection of information about a range of 
potential targets, elaborating such information in order to decide which target to pursue, and 
bidding a convenient offer (Makadok and Barney, 2001; Puranam et al., 2006). The value created 
through selection stage is therefore extrinsic to the acquired firm, as it is not determined by any 
change in that firm’s underlying business. Rather, it is derived from acquirer firms’ superior (i.e., 
more precise) assessments about potential target companies’ values and the ensuing bidding for 
targets whose current standalone is erroneously underestimated by other players (Capron and Shen, 
2007; Reuer and Ragozzino, 2008).  
In contrast, the restructuring stage consists of unlocking the potential value of the target 
through careful management of the post-acquisition process. An acquiring firm can create value 
in this stage by creating synergies (when the target is integrated) and/or improving the standalone 
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value of the acquired firm (when it is not integrated). In the first case, synergies between acquirer 
and target can be realized in different areas, such as production, R&D, administration, and human 
resource management (Chatterjee et al., 1992; Datta, 1991; Hitt, Harrison, and Ireland, 2001b; 
Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). In the latter, the target’s standalone value can be increased by 
improving its operational effectiveness – e.g., implementing cost cutting programs or replacing 
inefficient management teams – and/or by increasing its strategic distinctiveness – e.g., redefining 
some key strategic variable such as which markets it serves (Wright et al., 2001b; Wright, 
Hoskisson, and Busenitz, 2001a). The value created through the restructuring stage is therefore 
intrinsic to the acquired company, in that it involves a fundamental transformation of the 
underlying business.  
We argue that, compared to the selection stage, the restructuring stage is more causally 
ambiguous because it is a) more complex – in that composed by a higher number of more 
interdependent activities; and b) requires a longer time span before its outcomes can be observed. 
As far as complexity is concerned, both Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) and Cording, Christmann, 
and King (2008) point out that organizational transformation in the post-acquisition phase is 
usually composed of many activities (“from the conversion of the information system, to the 
integration of supply and distribution chain, from the selection, retention and motivation of human 
resources to the restructuring and reorganization of the new product development” (Zollo, 2000, 
p. 206)), which are simultaneously executed and mutually dependent on each other. For instance 
no matter how well communication with the key customers of the acquired company has been 
handled, all will go to waste if its sale people are not retained and effectively motivated (and vice 
versa) (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). The reciprocal interdependency among the large number 
of typical activities of the post-acquisition phase makes the entire process exceptionally complex 
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(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). The resulting confusion and lack of clarity makes it quite difficult 
for a newly combined entity to isolate the performance effects of these different activities (Cording 
et al., 2008).  
By contrast, the selection phase consists of a quite limited and well defined set of activities 
(mainly target search, evaluation and bidding), which makes the overall process not only easier to 
execute than the restructuring stage (Barkema and Schijven, 2008a), but probably also more simple 
to evaluate ex post. Furthermore, activities in the selection phases are executed sequentially: target 
search naturally precedes the evaluation (i.e., the due diligence) of the selected target(s), which in 
turn precedes the final bidding (Galpin and Herndon, 2010). Due to the sequential nature of this 
stage, it is relatively simple to decompose the overall process in order to assess the performance 
contribution of each activity.   
Finally, the time span between the execution of restructuring stages and the realization of 
their outcomes is typically quite long. Any short-term indicators of the restructuring phase 
performance might be in fact a poor (or even bad) predictor of the overall value created through 
restructuring in the long term. For example a cost-cutting program might be beneficial in the short 
term, but can generate (unexpected) negative long-term implications on the retention of top 
employees (Zollo and Meier, 2008). Hence, it could take at least three years to observe the actual 
economic impact of changes implemented in the target company’s business (Cording et al., 2008). 
On the contrary, the feedback of the value selection stage is much more immediate. Once the target 
has been acquired, the information asymmetry between it and the acquirer is probably resolved 
rather quickly, and the acquirer can realize the extent to which its ex ante assessment of the target 
was accurate and whether the price paid reflects the current value of the firm net of any 
restructuring (Puranam et al., 2006). 
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Since experience translates into learning more effectively when the action or decision at 
hand is not causally ambiguous (March and Olsen, 1975; Zollo, 2009), past acquisition experience 
is more likely to teach firms how to select undervalued targets ex ante, rather than how to 
restructure firms ex post. Hence, acquisition experience – whose direct effect on performance 
cannot be anticipated based on extant literature, and so is an empirical matter – should have a more 
positive effect on acquisition performance in any scenario where creating value depends more 
heavily on the proper implementation of the selection stage than that of the subsequent 
restructuring stage – that is to say, in selection-oriented (as opposed to restructuring-oriented) 
acquisitions17. Based on the previous reasoning, we formulate a general proposition, which will 
guide us in the hypotheses development: 
Proposition: The correlation between a firm’s acquisition experience and acquisition 
performance becomes more positive in any contingency which makes the focal acquisition 
more selection (as opposed to restructuring) oriented.  
The empirical context: acquisitions by private equity firms 
For this study, we chose to focus on acquisitions performed by PE firms – often called buyouts – 
which take the form of the purchase of a controlling-stake in a company (or a division) from its 
owners, usually with a limited time horizon (Gilligan and Wright, 2012; Pe’Er and Gottschalg, 
2011a; Wruck, 2008). The major difference between a strategic acquisition and a buyout is that, 
while the former is often aimed at complementing an existing company through the creation of 
synergies, the latter is typically aimed at running the acquired business independently, and then 
                                                 
17 Saying that acquisition experience has a more positive impact on buyout performance when selection is more (less) 
important than restructuring implies that: if the direct effect of acquisition experience on performance is positive, is 
becomes more (less) positive; if the direct effect is negative, it becomes less (more) negative.  
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selling it at a profit (Landau and Bock, 2013). However, this does not imply that the restructuring 
phase is less complex or important for PE firms rather than for strategic acquirers, as also PE firms 
tend to intervene substantially on improving the operations of the acquired companies in the post-
acquisition phase (Acharya et al., 2013). 
The reasons for choosing the PE industry as empirical context are twofold. First, companies 
acquired during buyouts tend to only remain in the private equity firm’s portfolio for a limited 
period, and to be handled completely independently from one another: they generally remain 
separate legal and financial entities, operating as stand-alone firms with no cross-subsidies or 
forced inter-firm sales (Landau and Bock, 2013). This makes it possible to measure the 
performance of each single acquisition independently from the performance of other companies in 
the portfolio – in other words, without confounding factors.  
Second, the PE context is particularly well suited to discriminating the impact of experience 
on selection from that on restructuring. On the one hand, PE firms may be good ‘scouts’ that create 
value by selecting currently undervalued companies (Chan, 1983; Shepherd, Ettenson, and Crouch, 
2000); on the other, they may be particularly good ‘coaches’ that make profits from ensuring that 
the firms in which they invest are well managed (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Jain and Kini, 1995), 
so that they gain value (Wright et al., 2001b, 2001a).  
We therefore apply our main theoretical argument – i.e., that acquisition experience (i.e., 
the number of buyouts bought and already sold) mainly translates into learning to select, as 
opposed to learning to add value – in the context of acquisitions performed by PE firms. If our 
argument is true, we should observe that acquisition experience has a more (less) positive impact 
on buyout performance where the focal buyout is more selection (restructuring) oriented.  
Whether the focal acquisition or buyout is selection or restructuring oriented is likely 
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determined by: a) the internal human resources that a PE firm is provided with at the time of the 
acquisition and b) the external environment it faces when acquiring the focal target. As for 
corporate resources, we focus on the educational background of PE firm’s top management team, 
which in fact “represents a unique organizational resource” (Hitt, Biermant, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 
2001, p. 13) and contributes shaping firm strategy and performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
Hitt and Tyler, 1991). As for the external environment, based on the strategic factor market 
literature (Barney, 1986), we focus on the extent to which the information environment faced by 
the acquiring firm is transparent – i.e., the information about target firms is homogenous and 
available to all potential acquirers.  
Theory and hypotheses 
The type of educational background possessed by the acquiring firm’s top management  
The first contingency affecting whether an acquisition is selection or restructuring oriented is the 
type of educational background possessed by the acquiring firm’s top management at the time of 
the focal acquisition. Top management has long been considered as a critical resource for firms 
(Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and Sanders, 2004; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hitt et al., 2001a) 
because it comprises the most influential executives in an organization who have influence over 
strategic choices and outcomes (Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009a). Based on this 
understanding, a well-established stream of literature has explored how the characteristics of top 
management might affect firm’s strategies and performance (Carpenter and Weikel, 2011; 
Finkelstein, Whitehead, and Campbell, 2009b).   
In particular, it has been suggested that the education of top managers might play a 
particularly important role (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hitt and Tyler, 1991; Hitt et al., 2001a). 
The reason is that education provides a repertoire of cognitive models and competences, which 
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both naturally influence the way executives perceive and solve problems. In this regard, the type 
of education is crucial: in fact “we might expect those with formal education in engineering to 
utilize different cognitive models in making decisions than those with formal education in liberal 
arts or business” (Hitt & Tyler, 1991, p. 333). In fact, it has been shown that managers with 
postgraduate degree in technical and scientific fields tend to spend more resources in R&D 
compared to managers with other backgrounds (Barker III and Mueller, 2002). At the same time, 
CEOs with a finance education possibly believe that motivating employees is not a crucial factor 
for firm competitive advantage. Hence, they are less likely to spend resources for building a 
suitable job environment (Andrews and Welbourne, 2000). 
Based on the previous evidence, we advance that the type of education might influence 
firm “acquisition style” and so make the focal acquisition more or less selection oriented. In 
particular, a finance education possibly leads top managers to create value by selecting rather than 
by restructuring. On the one hand, top managers with a finance educational background often 
display a financial conception of firm as “a collection of assets earning varying rate of returns” 
(Fligstein, 1990, p. 238-239). Such a cognitive framework naturally “leads management to focus 
on the market instead of internal operations” (Andrews & Welbourne, 2000, p.95). In an 
acquisition context, this implies that top managers focus more on evaluating the resources of a 
target company rather than improving them. On the other hand, a finance education provides a 
repertoire of “hard” skills specifically focused on asset evaluation (Andrews and Welbourne, 
2000), which are particularly useful for the quantitative and objective assessment of a target firm’s 
assets.  
By contrast, we might argue that a graduate level business education induces top managers 
to create value by restructuring rather than by selecting undervalued targets. First, a business 
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education usually offers knowledge from diverse fields (e.g., management, economics, sociology, 
psychology, etc.). Such a broad perspective not only makes executives prone to adopt alternative 
ways of thinking and doing, but it also “may be seen to facilitate the managers in taking the position 
of others” (Hay & Hodgkinson, 2008, p. 29). This cognitive flexibility is particularly useful for 
managing situations of change, such as those implied by restructuring a company (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991). Second, a business education provides a broad understanding of different firm 
functions, like R&D, operations, human resources, strategy, marketing and sales (Sturges et al., 
2003). Therefore, executives with a business education are possibly able to understand and manage 
the complex interdependencies characterizing the activities of the restructuring phase.  
Overall, we therefore expect that the acquisition will become more selection (restructuring) 
oriented when the proportion of the acquiring firm’s top management with an education in finance 
(business) increases. Such reasoning naturally holds true also for the top management of PE firms, 
which usually might choose between pursuing hands-off selection oriented buyouts (Makadok and 
Barney, 2001; Puranam et al., 2006) rather than hands-on restructuring oriented buyouts (Larsson 
and Finkelstein, 1999; Wright et al., 2001b, 2001a). When the proportion of top management with 
an education in finance is higher, any buyout pursued by that PE firm will more likely be selection-
oriented – such that experience will play a more positive role. In contrast, when the educational 
background of top management is more business-oriented, the buyout will more likely be 
restructuring-oriented – such that the positive impact of experience on performance will be weaker. 
Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The correlation between a PE firm’s acquisition experience and buyout 
performance becomes more positive when the proportion of top management with an 
education in finance is higher. 
64 
 
Hypothesis 2: The correlation between a PE firm’s acquisition experience and buyout 
performance becomes more positive when the proportion of top management with an 
education in business is higher. 
The transparency of the information environment  
The second contingency we take into account is the transparency of the information environment 
in which target companies operate – that is, the extent to which information about potential targets 
is publicly available to all buyers, as opposed to being private. If, as we argue, acquisition 
experience mainly generates learning about how to select targets undervalued by other acquirers, 
then its positive effect on deal performance should be weaker in environments where information 
about target companies is mainly public and thus easily available. In such a scenario, all potential 
acquirers would have similar (and unbiased) assessments about a target’s current value. Hence, 
there is no possibility of acquiring undervalued targets and so the only way to create value is given 
by the superior ability to restructure ex post the target company. In other words, the transparency 
of the information environment naturally makes acquisitions less selection oriented (that is 
equivalent to say more restructuring oriented). 
In a sense, markets for acquiring corporate control of firms function in the same way as 
other markets for strategic resources – so called “strategic factor markets” (Barney, 1986) – where 
one crucial route to superior economic performance is having more accurate expectations about a 
resource’s future value than other players. Firms who can assess such future value more accurately 
can avoid economic losses due to overestimation and will also be better able to exploit valuable 
resources that are underestimated by other companies (Barney, 1986; Denrell, Fang, and Winter, 
2003; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Makadok and Barney, 2001). However, this informational 
advantage can only arise and be sustained in environments where information is unevenly 
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distributed across firms – that is, where information environments are less transparent. Otherwise, 
firms can rely on the same information and will estimate resources similarly. Therefore, the 
competition for acquiring them would drive economic profits down towards zero (Barney, 1986).  
To understand how information transparency makes acquisitions less selection oriented 
and thus penalizes experienced acquirers – provided with a superior ability to select, according to 
our theory – consider the following example. There is one target and two potential acquirers: one 
experienced and the other inexperienced. In a first scenario, the information environment is not 
transparent at all such that the information is unevenly distributed among them. In particular, the 
experienced acquirer, better in executing during the selection stage, has more reliable private 
information on the target and knows its current standalone value. The inexperienced acquirer 
instead has lower quality private information and so underestimates the value of the target. In such 
a situation, the experienced acquirer will be able to make profits simply by buying the undervalued 
target for a price inferior to its current value.  
Consider now a second scenario where, before bidding, all information about the target 
becomes public: since acquirers are provided with the same information about the value of the 
target firm, bidding competition among them would naturally drive the price of the firm up to its 
current standalone value (Capron and Shen, 2007), such that the value created through selection 
will be zero. This scenario clearly penalizes the experienced acquirer, who, without any increase 
in informational transparency, would have been able to earn abnormal returns just by leveraging 
the informational advantage. 
The previous reasoning holds true for any context where more acquirers compete for the 
same targets, and so it is obviously true in the PE context, too. In principle, experienced PE firms 
enjoy informational advantages over less experienced PE firms in that they have probably learned 
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to collect information over time about potential targets more effectively. But, if the information 
environment becomes more transparent – for instance, if some regulatory change obliges or 
incentivizes potential target companies to disclose more or better quality information about their 
assets (Armstrong et al., 2012) – the fraction of value that can be created through selection 
naturally decreases. Therefore, the advantage enjoyed by more experienced PE firms at the 
selection stage would also decrease. Based on this understanding, we can formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The correlation between a PE firm’s acquisition experience and the focal 
buyout performance becomes less positive as information environments, at the time of the 
focal acquisition, become more transparent, i.e., where greater amounts of information 
about potential target companies become publicly available.  
Research Design 
Research setting and data 
We rely on a dataset of 946 PE buyouts of US target firms realized by 51 PE firms between 
1976 and 2005. To construct this dataset, we started from a database of 4,450 buyouts realized by 
167 private equity firms in US between 1973 and 2008. We assembled these data by collecting PE 
firms’ fund-raising prospectuses – usually referred as Private Placement Memoranda (PPM) – 
which contain performance indicators and some other characteristics of their prior buyouts. Of the 
4,450 initial buyouts of US target firms, we retained only those for which we were able to identify 
the US state where the target firm was incorporated, because – in order to measure the transparency 
of the target companies’ information environments – we needed to be aware of longitudinal 
changes in local anti-takeover regulations, which have an important impact on the amount and 
quality of information disclosed by public companies (Armstrong et al., 2012). We also excluded 
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from our analysis any PE firm for which we could not discover key pieces of information (e.g., 
industry, buyout year, performance). Moreover, we excluded from our analysis any PE firm for 
which we could not have complete information about their top management team members. This 
information was collected through different sources: curriculum vitae (CVs) contained in the 
PPMs or other documents provided to investors (e.g., the due diligence packs provided to investors 
in PE firms), the Galante Private Equity Directories from 1996 (hence covering year 1995) to 2006, 
and PE firms’ websites.  
Unlike commercially available data on such firms, which only provides performance 
measures at the fund level, our dataset enables us to measure the performance of each individual 
buyout, independent of the performance of other buyouts in the PE firm’s portfolio. Moreover, our 
dataset contains the complete track record of each firm’s past buyouts, which eliminates the 
problem of self-reported biases that arise in survey-based samples of privately held companies 












Gross internal rate of return (IRR)To measure the performance of each buyout, we used the gross 
IRR, calculated as the annually compounded discount rate that would make the net present value 





The gross IRR is calculated using monthly gross cash inflows (i.e., capital calls from the investor 
in the PE fund) and outflows (i.e., capital distributions to the investor in the PE fund) for each 
investment. Similarly to previous studies (e.g., Castellaneta & Zollo, forthcoming; Lopez-de-
Silanes, Phalippou, & Gottschalg, forthcoming) we compute the gross IRR, that is, the IRR gross 
of expenses, fees, carried interests, and management fees.  
The most intuitive way to understand the meaning of the IRR is to think of it as the 
equivalent constant interest rate during the life of the investment “at which a given series of capital 
drawdowns must be invested in order for the private equity investor to earn a given series of cash 
distributions as income” (Talmor & Vasvari, 2011, p. 43). The IRR is a commonly used measure 
of performance in the private equity industry because it takes into account the timing of cash flows 
realized at different points in time during the investment life.  
Independent variables.  
Acquisition experience. The PE firm’s stock of acquisition experience is measured as the number 
of the PE firm’s buyouts completed before the focal target firm was acquired (Reagans, Argote, 
and Brooks, 2005). Thus, this measure only takes into account those deals where the PE firm 
                                                 
18 Following previous studies on buyout performance (e.g., Lopez-de-Silanes et al., forthcoming), we censored 
observations above the 99th percentile, for which IRR is greater than 20. Retaining them produced similar results. 
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completed the entire buyout process, from the initial acquisition up to the point when the acquired 
company was resold, so that it could learn by observing the outcome of the full buyout-resale 
process.  
Finance education background. This variable measures the percentage of a PE firm’s top 
managers who, at the time of the focal acquisition, had previously completed the Chartered 
Financial Analyst (CFA) program. The CFA is a professional credential offered by the CFA 
Institute to investment and financial professionals. A candidate who successfully completes three 
exams over three years (and also meets the professional requirement of 48 months of work 
experience) is awarded the “CFA charter”. Each exam of the CFA curriculum comprises different 
areas: ethics, quantitative methods, corporate finance, financial reporting and analysis, equity 
investments, fixed income, derivatives, alternative investments, portfolio management, and 
economics. The financial educational background required to successfully pass these exams 
provides the financial tools most needed for properly assessing a firm’s assets, which are likely to 
be particularly useful for the acquisition selection phase.   
Business education background. This variable measures the percentage of a PE firm’s top 
managers who, at the time of the focal acquisition, had previously earned a Master of Business 
Administration (MBA) degree. An accredited MBA curriculum provides business related 
knowledge from diverse fields (i.e., economics, sociology, psychology), by covering areas such as 
entrepreneurship, marketing, human resources, operations management, project management, 
strategy, organizational behavior, accounting, and corporate governance. The business education 
background acquired after completing an MBA degree provides the management tools most 
needed in managing the complex restructuring phase. 
Transparency of local information environment. A good proxy for a change in the 
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transparency of the target firm’s information environment is the enactment of business 
combination laws in those states where they are incorporated. Such laws are meant to prevent 
potential acquirers from taking over a public company during a specified period of time without 
the explicit permission of the target’s board (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003). However, as 
Armstrong et al. (2012) have shown, the enactment of these laws has a significant effect on the 
wider information environments in states where such laws have been passed, such that public firms 
supply higher quality information. This occurs because managers of public companies more 
protected from the threat of takeover could, in theory, become less concerned about the company’s 
performance. To convince external investors that this is not the case, they provide them with better 
and more information. 
Improvements in the accessibility of information about public companies in such states 
probably also leads to improvements in the information available about the value of private firms 
located in those states. Indeed, the usual way of estimating the value of a private company is by 
comparing it to the values of ‘comparables’, that is, similar public companies affected by the same 
local environmental conditions (Bowman and Bush, 2006). Hence, the availability of better 
financial data about the ‘comparables’ provides the basis for more reliable and less biased 
estimates of the value of private companies in the same state. Accordingly, we expect that the 
enactment of anti-takeover laws has made the information environment more transparent for 
companies (public or private) based in states where such laws have been passed. Appendix A lists 
the years in which US states have passed antitakeover regulation.  
A key issue is whether the enactment of anti-takeover legislation constitutes an exogenous 
event with respect to PE firms. Extant literature suggests that the passage of such laws should be 
uncorrelated with PE firm characteristics, so that they offer an ideal context for a quasi-natural 
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experiment. For example, Romano (1987) analyzes the political context that characterized the 
passage of anti-takeover laws in various US states and concludes that they are nearly always 
promoted by specific companies – those under threat of takeover – rather than being the result of 
organized efforts by firms in general (including PE firms). Thus, for most companies, their 
enactment appears to be an exogenous event.  
Control variables 
From a systematic review of prior empirical studies on PE firms (Barber and Goold, 2007; Kaplan 
and Schoar, 2005; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Kreuter, Gottschalg, and Zollo, 2005; Phalippou 
and Gottschalg, 2009) and corporate acquisitions (Kim and Finkelstein, 2009), we derived a set of 
control variables to rule out potentially confounding factors with our independent variables.  
 The first set of controls accounts for the educational background and work experience of 
top management at PE firms. Ivy League education background controls for the percentage of 
managers who have earned a degree (baccalaureate, masters, or professional) granted by an Ivy 
League university. Consulting work experience, entrepreneurship work experience and legal work 
experience represent the percentage of managers with past work experience, respectively, as a 
consultant, entrepreneur and lawyer.  
The second group of control relates to two characteristics of PE firm acquisition (Wright, 
Gilligan, and Amess, 2009). Larger and older PE firms are likely to have not only more acquisition 
experience, but also more resources and managerial skills and higher reputations, which can help 
them execute buyouts more successfully (Folta and Janney, 2004). We therefore include PE fund 
size, measured as the total equity raised by the fund that acquired a focal company (Laamanen and 
Keil, 2008), and PE firm age, measured as the number of years between its foundation and the 
entry year of the focal buyout (Seppä and Laamanen, 2001). Finally, we included PE firm fixed 
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effects to control for any time-invariant, unobservable PE firm characteristics.  
 The third set of controls accounts for the various characteristics of the focal buyout: buyout 
size, measured as the total equity paid for the buyout (expressed in millions of 2006 US$); duration 
of the focal investment, measured as the length of time (in years) between the start of the buyout 
to the completion of the resale – so if a PE firm bought a company in 2000 and resold it in 2002, 
the duration equals 2; IPO which takes the value of 1 when the investment is exited through an 
IPO; entry year fixed effects. Finally, we included the target firm’s state and industry fixed effects 
to control for unobserved state and industry heterogeneity, respectively.  
Empirical strategy 
Our analysis refers to the single buyout level. To test hypothesis 1, we use an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) model, in which the dependent variable is the performance of the buyout of a certain target 
company i by a private equity firm j. That is: 
IRR , 	α ∗ Experience , β ∗ _ _ ,  
γ ∗ Experience , ∗ _ _ , δZ e ,   (3.1) 
The experiencej variable measures the number of acquisitions already resold by the PE firm j 
before the year in which the focal company i is bought; Finance educational backgroundi is the 
percentage of top managers with a finance background at the time the focal company i is acquired 
by the PE firm; Z is a vector of the control variables listed and described in the previous section; 
ei,j is the stochastic error, which we clustered at the PE firm level. Consistent with hypothesis 1, 
we expect γ to be positive and significant.  
To test hypothesis 2, we estimate the following equation:  
IRR , 	α ∗ Experience , β ∗ _ _ , γ ∗
Experience , ∗ _ _ , δZ 	e , 		(3.2) 
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_ _ , is the percentage of top managers with a business 
background at the time of the focal i is acquired. Consistent with hypothesis 2, we expect γ to be 
positive and significant.  
To test hypothesis 3, we estimate the following equation:  
IRR , 	α ∗ Experience , β ∗ _ _ γ ∗
Experience , ∗ _ _ δZ e ,   (3.3) 
Transparency_info_environmenti is a variable equal to 1 if the state where the target company i is 
incorporated has enacted anti-takeover business combination laws – such that its information 
environment is more transparent than those where such regulations have not been enacted – and 0 
otherwise. Consistent with hypothesis 3, we expect γ to be negative and significant. Table 3.1 
describes all variables used in the analysis. 
Results 












IRR The internal rate of return of the private equity firm buyout into the target company.  
  Source: proprietary database. 
Acquisition 
experience 
The number of buyouts already realized by the private equity firm up to the focal buyout.  
  Source: proprietary database. 
Finance education 
background 
Proportion of PE firm top managers with a CFA charter over the total number of PE firm top managers. 
  Source: proprietary database. 
Business education 
background 
Number of PE firm top managers with a MBA degree over the total number of PE firm top managers. 
  Source: proprietary database. 
Transparency Equal to 1 if the state where the target firm is incorporated did enact the antitakeover regulation.  
  Source: (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) 
Buyout duration The difference between the year when the target company was bought by the private equity firm, and the 
year when it was sold.  
  Source: proprietary database. 
Buyout size  The overall amount of equity invested by the private equity firm, in 2006 $US.  
  Source: proprietary database. 
Fund size The amount of money collected by the fund, in 2006 $US. Source: proprietary database. 
Firm age The number of years since the foundation of the PE firm with respect to the entry year of the focal buyout.  
  Source: proprietary database. 
Entry year dummies Equal to 1 in the entry year of the focal buyout. Source: proprietary database. 
Incorporation state 
dummies 
Equal to 1 for the state of incorporation of the target company. Source: proprietary database. 
Industry dummies Equal to 1 for the industry where the target company operates. Source: proprietary database. 
IPO dummy  Equal to 1 when the investment is exited through an IPO. Source: proprietary database. 
Consulting work 
experience 
Number of PE firm top managers with consulting experience over the total number of PE firm top managers. 
  Source: proprietary database. 
Entrepreneurship work 
experience 
Number of PE firm top managers with entrepreneurship experience over the total number of PE firm top 
managers. 
  Source: proprietary database. 
Ivy League education 
background 
Number of PE firm top managers with any educational degree from an Ivy League university over the total 
number of PE firm top managers. 
  Source: proprietary database. 
Legal work experience Number of PE firm top managers with a law degree over the total number of PE firm top managers. 




The average proportion of PE firm top managers with a CFA charter in all buyouts done in the same year, 
industry and state of the focal buyout. 




The average proportion of PE firm top managers with a MBA degree in all buyouts done in the same year, 
industry and state of the focal buyout. 




Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
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IRR 946 0.44 1.55 -1.00 16.30 
Experience 946 18.38 22.48 0.00 151.00 
Experience (10 years) 946 13.38 16.08 0.00 110.00 
Experience (5%) 946 12.51 14.89 0.00 94.23 
Experience (discount age) 946 10.12 11.82 0.00 73.48 
Finance education background 946 0.13 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Business education background 946 0.58 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Transparency 946 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Consulting work experience 946 0.33 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Entrepreneurship work experience 946 0.30 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Legal work experience 946 0.15 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Ivy League education background 946 0.53 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Duration 946 5.74 4.04 0.00 28.00 
IPO 946 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Buyout size 946 70.12 221.09 0.10 6,143.15 
PE firm age 946 9.20 6.25 0.00 28.08 
Fund size 946 928.78 1,291.19 5.00 6,450.00 
 
Table 3.2 shows that the average performance of a buyout, as measured by its IRR, equals 
0.44, which means that financial acquirers in our sample made average yearly profits of 44 per 
cent from each buyout. The number of acquisitions made by PE firms in our sample (which equates 
to our acquisition experience measure) was, on average, approximately 18. Interestingly, the 
correlation between IRR and experience was positive and not significant: but more robust findings 
about the relationships between experience and performance could only be obtained in a 
multivariate framework, in which the effects of acquisition experience can be disentangled from 
those of other variables. 
Table 3.4 presents the result of the OLS regressions used to estimate equations (3.1), (3.2) 
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and (3.3). The standalone impact of experience is significant only in specifications (3) and (4). 
This finding is consistent with previous studies showing that the impact of experience per se is not 
significant (or is only slightly so) in strategic contexts, and suggests that “important contingencies 
are at play and, thus, researchers need to dig deeper” (Barkema & Schijven, 2008b, p. 595). In 
particular, according to our theory, the impact of acquisition experience on the performance of the 
focal deal should be more positive in any contingency where the performance outcome relies more 
heavily on the proper implementation of the selection rather than of the restructuring stage.  
More specifically – as proposed in hypothesis 1 – experience should have a more positive 
impact when the presence of top managers with an education in finance increases: and, indeed, 
consistent with our theory, we find that the correlation between experience and performance 
becomes more positive as the proportion of executives with a CFA increases (β=0.084, p<0.05) 
(Table 3.4, column 2). 
Another contingency considered was the presence of executives with graduate level 
education in business. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the correlation between experience and 
performance should be greater when the presence of top executive with a business educational 
background is higher. We find the coefficient of the interaction between experience and Business 
education background is negative and significant (β=-0.046, p<0.01) (Table 3.4, column 3). 
Hypothesis 3 proposes that the correlation between acquisition experience and IRR will be 
lower when the information environment improves, and indeed we find that the coefficient of the 
interaction between acquisition experience and information environment transparency is negative 
and significant (β=-0.012, p<0.05) (Table 3.4, column 4). In particular, after the state enactment 
of business combination laws (the proxy we used to measure information environment 
improvements). Finally, we also check whether our results are robust to the inclusion of all three 
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interactions in the same model. Results are similar to those found in the previous models (Table 
3.4, Model 5). 
Robustness checks 
We first run an analysis to check whether our results might be biased by some endogeneity 
issues. In particular, it could be argued that the finance or business education backgrounds of top 
managers are purposefully targeted by PE companies in order to increase acquisition performance, 
meaning that these factors are not exogenous. To tackle this issue, we therefore adopted an 
instrumental variable approach. In particular, we used the average of finance education 
background of all buyouts in the same year, state and industry as an instrument for finance 
education background. Similarly, we used the average of business education background of all the 
companies investing in the same year, state and industry as an instrument for business education 
background in the focal buyout. The assumption is that some idiosyncratic characteristics of the 
buyout year (e.g., the economic situation), of the industry (e.g., its maturity) or the local 
environment (for instance, the state’s enactment of certain regulations) exogenously determines 
the PE firm’s choices with regards to both the finance and business backgrounds of their top  
executives. Table 3.5 presents the results of the instrumental variable model, which are largely 
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 
               
               
1.00               
0.99*** 1.00              
0.99*** 1.00*** 1.00             
0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 1.00            
0.10** 0.10** 0.10** -0.07* 1.00           
0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.00 0.03 1.00          
0.20*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.48*** 0.01 0.03 1.00         
-0.08* -0.09** -0.09** 0.09** -0.04 -0.03 0.09** 1.00        
* -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.17*** -0.28 -0.12*** -0.07* -0.32*** 1.00       
0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** -0.33*** 0.58*** 0.04 -0.03 -0.15*** 0.03 1.00      
* -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 0.01 0.07* -0.14*** 0.02 -0.20*** 0.21*** 0.14*** 1.00     
-0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.08* -0.02 -0.02 -0.09** 0.06 0.06 0.11*** 1.00    
0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** -0.09** -0.01 -0.00 -0.10** -0.13*** 0.07* 0.08* 0.11*** 0.01 1.00   
0.65*** 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.05 -0.01 0.19*** 0.11*** -0.03 -0.16*** 0.05 -0.15*** -0.06 0.15*** 1.00  
0.49*** 0.53*** 0.53*** -0.15*** 0.10** 0.09** -0.15*** -0.22*** -0.09** 0.23*** -0.03 -0.01 0.36*** 0.50*** 1.00 
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Table 3.4 The impact of experience on IRR: OLS regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable IRR IRR IRR IRR IRR 
Experience 0.004 -0.012 0.033*** 0.012* 0.019 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) (0.015) 
Finance education background (FEB) -0.692 -1.101 -0.596 -0.581 -0.882 
 (1.086) (1.100) (1.082) (1.083) (1.097) 
Experience * FEB (H1)  0.084**   0.072* 
  (0.038)   (0.039) 
Business education background 1.695*** 1.509*** 1.796*** 1.759*** 1.663*** 
 (0.559) (0.564) (0.558) (0.558) (0.564) 
Experience * BEB (H2)    -0.046***  -0.034* 
   (0.017)  (0.018) 
Transparency -0.355 -0.388 -0.288 -0.102 -0.128 
 (0.283) (0.283) (0.283) (0.301) (0.300) 
Experience * Transparency (H3)      -0.012** -0.010* 
    (0.005) (0.005) 
Consulting work experience 1.460* 2.057** 1.379 1.328 1.805** 
 (0.854) (0.895) (0.851) (0.853) (0.895) 
Entrepreneurship work experience -0.594 -0.833 -0.789 -0.636 -0.977 
 (0.702) (0.709) (0.703) (0.700) (0.707) 
Legal work experience 0.423 0.654 0.155 0.390 0.397 
 (0.733) (0.739) (0.736) (0.730) (0.744) 
Ivy League education background -0.625 -1.126 -0.374 -0.555 -0.813 
 (0.657) (0.695) (0.661) (0.656) (0.703) 
Duration -0.086*** -0.097*** -0.089*** -0.085*** -0.097*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
IPO 0.618*** 0.622*** 0.610*** 0.612*** 0.611*** 
 (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.129) 
Buyout size -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
PE firm age 0.159 0.184 0.142 0.152 0.163 
 (0.185) (0.185) (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) 
Fund size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 1.727 1.937 1.578 1.671 1.752 
 (2.504) (2.500) (2.494) (2.496) (2.488) 
      
Entry Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Incorporation State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 946 946 946 946 946 
R-squared 0.285 0.290 0.292 0.291 0.298 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  




consistent with the findings presented in Table 3.4. In particular, the coefficient of the interaction 
between acquisition experience and finance education background remains positive and significant 
(β=0.127, p<0.05) (Table 3.5, Model 1), while the coefficient of interaction between experience 
and business education background is still negative and significant (β=-0.053, p<0.01) (Table 3.5, 
Model 2).  
Another concern involves the proxy we used for measuring the improvement in the 
information environment, i.e., the state enactment of business combination laws. Even if this event 
is exogenous, a criticism could be that business combination laws affect the acquisition process of 
public companies by changing the ‘rules of the game’ for acquiring such companies, rather than 
by improving the information environment directly. Hence, more experienced PE firms – which 
had developed abilities in dealing with the process of acquiring public companies before the 
regulatory change – suffer a greater loss than do less experienced companies after the shift in the 
regulatory environment, as their acquisition experience is probably not all re-deployable after the 
change. Even if this explanation could theoretically account for our results, we believe it is 
inappropriate for our sample, which is mainly (about 90%) composed of buyouts of private 
companies. Arguably, the only way business combination laws could affect the acquisition of 
private companies in our sample is by changing the overall local information environment, by 
inducing public companies (which are used as ‘comparables’ to assess the value of focal target 
private companies) to disclose more and higher quality information. However, to ensure our results 
are not due to the presence of public companies in our sample, we replicated the analysis including 




Table 3.5 The impact of experience on IRR: Instrumental Variable regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable IRR IRR IRR 
Experience -0.019* 0.038*** 0.014 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) 
Finance education background (IV-FEB) -1.286 -0.928 -1.018 
 (1.334) (1.351) (1.329) 
Experience * IV-FEB (H1) 0.127**  0.116** 
 (0.054)  (0.055) 
Business education background (IV-BEB) 0.872 1.146* 0.949 
 (0.695) (0.681) (0.692) 
Experience * IV-BEB (H2)     -0.053*** -0.038* 
  (0.020) (0.021) 
Transparency -0.406 -0.284 -0.150 
 (0.284) (0.284) (0.301) 
Experience * Transparency (H3)   -0.010* 
   (0.005) 
Consulting work experience 2.255** 1.387 1.970** 
 (0.928) (0.921) (0.930) 
Entrepreneurship work experience -1.156 -1.051 -1.350* 
 (0.737) (0.727) (0.741) 
Legal work experience 0.637 -0.051 0.334 
 (0.751) (0.753) (0.771) 
Ivy League education background -1.276* -0.300 -0.915 
 (0.714) (0.707) (0.735) 
Duration -0.102*** -0.088*** -0.102*** 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) 
IPO 0.624*** 0.607*** 0.614*** 
 (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) 
Buyout size -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
PE firm age 2.300 1.918 2.137 
 (2.512) (2.505) (2.500) 
Fund size -0.019* 0.038*** 0.014 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) 
Constant -1.286 -0.928 -1.018 
 (1.334) (1.351) (1.329) 
    
Entry Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Incorporation State Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 946 946 946 
R-squared 0.288 0.290 0.296 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6 The impact of experience on IRR: OLS regression (only private firms in the 
sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable IRR IRR IRR IRR 
Experience -0.011 0.039*** 0.014* 0.024 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.017) 
Finance education background (FEB) -0.624 -0.072 -0.014 -0.421 
 (1.210) (1.187) (1.189) (1.205) 
Experience * FEB (H1) 0.095**   0.083* 
 (0.043)   (0.043) 
Business education background (BEB) 1.509** 1.862*** 1.802*** 1.715*** 
 (0.615) (0.609) (0.608) (0.616) 
Experience * BEB (H2)  -0.051***  -0.040** 
  (0.019)  (0.020) 
Transparency -0.434 -0.326 -0.139 -0.161 
 (0.324) (0.324) (0.340) (0.339) 
Experience * Transparency (H3)   -0.013** -0.012** 
   (0.006) (0.006) 
Consulting work experience 1.746* 1.021 0.982 1.469 
 (0.982) (0.939) (0.942) (0.981) 
Entrepreneurship work experience -1.281* -1.260 -1.064 -1.454* 
 (0.776) (0.771) (0.767) (0.775) 
Legal work experience 0.575 0.082 0.321 0.333 
 (0.825) (0.822) (0.817) (0.828) 
Ivy League education background -0.835 -0.062 -0.213 -0.532 
 (0.763) (0.725) (0.721) (0.769) 
Duration -0.101*** -0.093*** -0.087*** -0.102*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
IPO 0.647*** 0.629*** 0.641*** 0.631*** 
 (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) 
Buyout size -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
PE firm age 0.254 0.198 0.208 0.234 
 (0.206) (0.205) (0.205) (0.205) 
Fund size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 3.306 2.854 2.899 3.243 
 (2.790) (2.779) (2.782) (2.775) 
     
Entry Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Incorporation State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 853 853 853 853 
R-squared 0.312 0.315 0.313 0.322 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Finally, previous studies have taken into account the possibility that experience depreciates 
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over time (e.g., Ingram & Baum, 1997). In this respect, our descriptive statistics suggest that this 
is unlikely to happen in the PE context, where on average, PE firms only execute 18 buyouts over 
their entire life; the average number further decreases to 13 if we exclude the outliers in terms of 
experience above the 95th percentile. This suggests that buyouts are strategic rare events (Zollo, 
2009) and, therefore, are unlikely to depreciate over time (e.g., (Argote, Beckman, and Epple, 
1990; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Ingram and Baum, 1997). However, we analyze whether 
our results are robust to the use of discounting rates for experience. More specifically, based on 
previous literature (e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002; Vermeulen & Barkema, 
2001), we use three different discounts of experience. First, we measure experience as the number 
of PE firm’s buyouts completed in the last ten years. This variable is called “Experience (10 
years)”. Second, we discount experience for a five per cent discount rate. This implies, for instance, 
that buyouts exited at time t-1 are multiplied by a factor of 100% and buyouts exited at time t-2 
are multiplied by a factor of 95%, and so on. This variable is called “experience (5%)”. Third, we 
discount experience by the cube root of experience age. This variable is called “experience 
(discount age)”. As shown in Table 3.7, our results are completely robust to the use of discounts 









Table 3.7 The impact of experience on IRR: Experience discounting  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable IRR IRR IRR 
Experience (10 years) 0.039*   
 (0.022)   
Experience (5%)  0.031  
  (0.023)  
Experience (discount age)   0.039 
   (0.030) 
Finance education background (FEB) -0.781 -0.894 -0.895 
 (1.107) (1.102) (1.103) 
Experience (10 years) * FEB (H1) 0.104*   
 (0.057)   
Experience (5%) * FEB (H1)  0.105*  
  (0.060)  
Experience (discount age) * FEB (H1)   0.132* 
   (0.076) 
Business education background (BEB) 1.724*** 1.693*** 1.702*** 
 (0.566) (0.566) (0.568) 
Experience (10 years) * BEB (H2) -0.070***   
 (0.026)   
Experience (5%) * BEB (H2)  -0.059**  
  (0.027)  
Experience (discount age) * BEB (H2)   -0.074** 
   (0.034) 
Transparency -0.134 -0.138 -0.138 
 (0.301) (0.301) (0.303) 
Experience (10 years) * Transparency (H3) -0.012*   
 (0.007)   
Experience (5%) * Transparency (H3)  -0.014*  
  (0.008)  
Experience (discount age) * Transparency (H3)   -0.017* 
   (0.010) 
Consulting work experience 1.739* 1.813** 1.812** 
 (0.898) (0.898) (0.898) 
Entrepreneurship work experience -0.888 -0.920 -0.911 
 (0.702) (0.705) (0.706) 
Legal work experience 0.326 0.391 0.402 
 (0.745) (0.744) (0.743) 
Ivy League education background -0.730 -0.810 -0.813 
 (0.710) (0.706) (0.706) 
Duration -0.099*** -0.098*** -0.098*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
IPO 0.615*** 0.614*** 0.613*** 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) 
Buyout size -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
PE firm age 0.174 0.171 0.171 
 (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) 
Fund size 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 1.751 1.777 1.766 
 (2.477) (2.480) (2.480) 
Entry Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Incorporation State Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 946 946 946 
R-squared 0.300 0.298 0.298 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  




We found that, in the PE context, experience acquired from buyouts translates more into learning 
to select targets, rather than learning to add value, such that more experienced PE firms perform 
better when the educational background of top managers at the PE firm is more finance oriented. 
Conversely, performance is worse when the educational background of top managers are more 
business oriented and the information environment is more transparent. Accordingly, our study 
offers several key contributions to prior literature.  
First, it suggests that the degree of causal ambiguity not only varies across decisions – i.e., 
operational vs. strategic – but, in strategic contexts, also across different stages of the same 
decision – i.e., selection vs. value addition. More specifically, we suggest that the likelihood of 
incurring causal ambiguity problems is higher during the value addition stage than in the selection 
stage. This finding might concern not only the acquisition context, but also other settings (such as 
alliances) where value is both created ex ante (e.g., by selecting the right alliance partner) and 
added ex post (by coordinating effectively with that partner).   
Second – and related to the previous point – this paper contributes to the stream of literature 
on the influence of experience in the context of strategic decisions. Prior research has mainly 
addressed whether experience impacts decision performance (Barkema & Schijven, 2008b), but 
we still have limited insights about how (that is, via which mechanisms) this happens (Haleblian 
et al., 2009). By disentangling selection and value addition stages, we offer new evidence on how 
experience actually creates value for firms engaging in acquisitions.  
Third, our findings may also contribute to solving the empirical puzzle of the acquisitions 
literature’s mixed results on the role of experience (e.g., Barkema & Schijven, 2008b). A possible 
explanation of such mixed findings is that those studies showing positive correlations between 
86 
 
experience and performance probably considered settings where the selection stage was more 
important than the value addition stage, while others – which report statistically not significant or 
even negative correlations – may have been conducted in contexts where the value addition stages 
were more relevant.  
Fourth, we contribute to the debate on whether PE firms create value mainly in the selection 
or value addition stage, and extend this discussion – which has been focused on young startups 
(e.g., Baum & Silverman, 2004) – to the context of buyouts, that is, to study PE investments in 
mature businesses. This issue has received surprisingly scant attention in the literature, 
notwithstanding PE firms’ importance in the strategic renewal of established businesses. By 
showing that experience accumulation impacts selection more strongly than value addition, we 
offer new evidence on the levers of value creation in PE firm buyouts.  
Finally, by examining the impact of institutions on business activity, we contribute to 
illustrating how government policies influence PE firms’ ability to generate profits (e.g., Pe’Er & 
Gottschalg, 2011). The link between government regulation and business activity is of central 
interest to practitioners, especially since government policies are more likely to affect companies’ 
economic value than actions by any other group of stakeholders except customers (McKinsey 
Global Survey, 2010). In this respect, we provide evidence about the importance of regulations 
such as anti-takeover laws on the performance of PE firms. 
Some limitations of this study are also worth noting. First, this paper has focused only on 
acquisitions realized by PE companies. In this regard, one might argue that the post-acquisition 
phase faced by a strategic acquirer, who usually integrates the acquired company into their 
business, is more complex than that faced by a financial acquirer, who usually runs the acquired 
business independently from other portfolio companies However, if so, our argument that 
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experience translates more into learning to select than to restructure should hold a fortiori for 
strategic acquirers, such that we expect our findings also to hold for strategic acquirers. 
Furthermore, a vast body of empirical evidence suggests that PE firms are often involved in a 
radical restructuring of the acquired companies (e.g., Acharya et al., 2013), which is at least as 
complex as the restructuring pursued by strategic acquirers. Second, we limit our analysis to the 
influence of acquisition experience as measured solely by the number of past acquisitions. It would 
be interesting to take more nuanced measures of experience into account, such as experience 
homogeneity and pacing. Third, we have no direct measures for value addition and selection – 
future surveys could find ways to better estimate these two dimensions and build direct measures 
for them. Finally, we can only claim that acquisition experience is positively correlated with better 
performance in those situations where selection is more relevant than value addition – but not that 
it is only experience that causes such performance increases, as other unobserved variables may 
confound its impact. Future studies could cope with this causality issue, for example relying on 
experimental methods which could isolate the effect of experience on performance net of all the 
other confounding variables.  
Despite these limitations, we believe this study provides important insights for managers 
and policy makers. On the one hand, the issue of whether PE firms make profits either through 
selection or value addition – which has been debated recently (Kosman, 2009) – has important 
implications for policy makers. In this paper, we have shown that accumulated experience 
translates more into a capacity to select rather than to add value. Hence, policy makers might want 
to attract investment from experienced or inexperienced PE firms – for instance, by using different 
taxation rates or enacting laws to change the information environment – according to whether they 
want to promote the selection of the best firms or the general enhancement of the managerial 
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capabilities of PE-backed companies.  
Our study also has relevant implications for practitioners. More experienced PE firms are 
likely to have competitive advantages in contexts characterized by higher levels of information 
asymmetries – so such PE firms should choose to operate in such contexts as emerging markets, 
where they can probably leverage their superior capacity to select (Cumming, Schmidt, and Walz, 
2004; La Porta et al., 1997b). Whether experienced PE firms can effectively achieve competitive 


















Table 3.8 Antitakeover laws passed by state 
State Year of enactment  State Year of enactment 
Arizona 1987  Nebraska 1988 
Connecticut 1989  Nevada 1991 
Delaware 1988  New Jersey 1986 
Hawaii -  New York 1985 
Georgia 1988  North Carolina - 
Idaho 1988  Oklahoma 1991 
Illinois 1989  Ohio 1990 
Indiana 1986  Oregon - 
Kansas 1989  Pennsylvania 1989 
Kentucky 1987  Rhode Island 1990 
Louisiana -  South Carolina 1988 
Maine 1988  South Dakota 1990 
Maryland 1989  Tennessee 1988 
Massachusetts 1989  Utah - 
Michigan 1989  Virginia 1988 
Minnesota 1987  Washington 1987 
Mississippi -  Wisconsin 1987 
Missouri 1986  Wyoming 1989 
 







4 Political party orientation and its effect on VC investment 
Abstract 
This study investigates how political party orientation and partisanship influences venture 
capital investment. In the United States, elected officials of the state and national executive 
branch are affiliated with two major representative parties: the Republican Party (“Red”) and 
the Democratic Party (“Blue”). Using a dataset of VC deals realized from 1980 to 2013, we 
find that states that have elected a  Republican governor generate more VC investment when 
also voting for a Democratic presidential candidate compared to a Republican candidate. We 
discuss policy mechanisms that can help explain these findings.  
Introduction 
Because of the potential impact that venture capital (VC) can bring to a region, policymakers have 
taken great interest in creating institutional environments conducive for VC investment with the 
intent of creating jobs and growing the economy (Lerner and Tåg, 2013). Even though a wide 
range of research has been conducted on how specific policies determined by policymakers 
influence VC investment (Black and Gilson, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Kemeny et al., 
2014; Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003, 2004; Lerner and Tåg, 2013; Poterba, 1989), a notable gap 
exists in the literature on how political context, and in particular, political party affiliation, affects 
VC investment. 
To fill the gap on VC and the political context shaped by political party preference, this 
empirical study focuses on partisanship between leaders at the state and national levels in the U.S. 
and its influence on VC investment within states. Hence, we observe election results from both the 
executive branch leader of a state (governor) and of the nation (president), who are elected from 
one of two representative political parties: the Republican Party (“Red”) and the Democratic Party 
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(“Blue”), where “the Republican Party is, in general, the more socially conservative and 
economically libertarian…has closer ties to Wall Street (large corporations) and little support 
among labor union leadership (Pe’er and Gottschalg, 2011: 1358).”  
We exploit longitudinal variation in partisanship across the U.S., as determined by a state’s 
elections results for the party affiliation of both the state’s elected governor and the state’s vote for 
president of the U.S. Results show that while states voting for a Republican governor did not result 
in higher VC investment compared to those states that voted for a Democratic governor, a state 
that elected a Republican governor increased VC investment more if it voted for a Blue president 
(regardless if that candidate was actually elected to serve as president) compared to a Red 
presidential candidate. In other words, when a state elects a Red governor and also votes for a Blue 
presidential candidate, VC investment increases by 18 percent. We also find that as the number of 
consecutive years a Republican governor sits in office increases by 10 percent, VC investment 
tends to decrease by 1.3 percent. Finally, results show that while policies that might influence 
capital gains tax rate and the number of new firms do not help explain the Red governor/Blue 
president state political effect on VC, policies that improve the quality of financial institutions may 
contribute to why the effect exists. 
This paper contributes to existing research in three ways. First, it extends the literature on 
institutions and investment (Lerner and Tåg, 2013). Second, it adds to the literature on political 
context and its effect on VC (e.g., Pe’Er and Gottschalg, 2011b). Third, we fill a gap on the topic 
of VC and partisanship, evaluating how state and national election outcomes might affect VC. 
Background 
Venture capital, institutional environment, and political context 
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Across the globe, developing and nurturing entrepreneurship and economic development have 
become important missions for policymakers, as these actions can lead to job creation and 
economic growth. Over the last two decades, VC has played a critical role in enhancing innovation 
ecosystems. Hence, politicians have been keenly interested in increasing the amount of VC activity 
within their localities, states, and nations (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002; Samila and Sorenson, 
2011a). An important part of attracting VC is creating an institutional environment conducive to 
investment (Lerner and Tåg, 2013).  
 Relying upon institutional theory (North, 1990; Scott, 1995), scholars have extensively 
studied how the institutional environment influenced by policies affects private equity, and in 
particular, VC. Such policies include: federal tax systems (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Keuschnigg 
and Nielsen, 2003, 2004; Poterba, 1989), intellectual property rights (IPRs) (Kemeny et al., 2014; 
Lerner and Tåg, 2013; Samila and Sorenson, 2011b), labor market regulations (Bosma and Levie, 
2010; Bozkaya and Kerr, 2013; Jeng and Wells, 2000), and financial markets (Black and Gilson, 
1998; Michelacci and Suarez, 2004). 
 Politicians play an important role in shaping the institutional environment through 
policymaking (Persson, 2002). They decide upon regulations and policies that may be important 
to investors (Gompers and Lerner, 2004; Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli, 2006). For example, 
politicians determine state and federal tax rates, where lower capital gains tax rates have been 
shown to lead to higher levels of VC fundraising and investment (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; 
Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003, 2004). Importantly, the types of policies and the ways that they 
are implemented primarily depend upon the party affiliation of politicians (Cohen, 2003). While 
there are numerous studies that have evaluated different policies and their relationship to VC, little 
is known about how party preference directly affects VC investment. 
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Political parties, elections, and venture capital 
In the U.S., there are two major representative political parties along all levels of government (i.e., 
local, state, and national) (Conover and Feldman, 1981). The Republican Party is generally known 
as the conservative party, aligning more predominantly with economic freedom (e.g., lower 
taxation and regulation, especially to businesses) and social conservatism (e.g., pro-life, pro-
traditional marriage, strict immigration policy). The Democratic Party is generally known as the 
liberal party, aligning more predominantly with economic involvement (e.g., higher taxation on 
the wealthy and businesses, anti-Wall Street) and social activism (e.g., loose immigration policy, 
increasing the minimum wage, Obamacare, climate change) (Pe’er and Gottschalg, 2011). While 
other parties do exist, they have played a relatively insignificant role compared to the Republican 
and Democratic parties.  
The U.S. has executive leadership at both the state and national levels. The leader of a 
state’s executive branch is the governor, who is elected by state citizens every four years (with 
the exception of New Hampshire and Vermont, which hold elections every two years). The 
majority of gubernatorial elections (39 of the 50 states) are held in years not concurrent with 
presidential elections (www.eac.gov). Much like the president of  the U.S., governors have state 
powers associated with the budget, appointment of judges and heads of agencies, and the ability 
to veto state legislative actions. The governor influences the environment in which VC and 
entrepreneurial firms operate (Barrilleaux and Berkman, 2003). For example, the state of 
Indiana, through its top economic development agency that reports to the governor’s cabinet, 
provides a tax credit (against Indiana tax liability) to VCs that invest in Indiana startups. 
 The president is the executive branch leader (elected every four years) of the nation and 
has similar powers to those of the state governor, as previously described, but at the national level. 
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For instance, the president appoints cabinet members, who oversee the Small Business 
Administration and Economic Development Agency, as well as appoints the members of the 
Federal Reserve (www.usa.gov). In each presidential election, citizens vote for a presidential 
candidate and each state’s electoral votes are generally appropriated to the state’s popular vote 
winner. Regardless if the chosen candidate becomes the president, that state is then considered a 
Red or a Blue state, depending on the party affiliation of the candidate they selected, until the next 
presidential election. Both the governor and the president are critical players in the way policies 
are adopted in the U.S.    
Politicians gain votes when voters seek to maximize utility from the policies that they 
believe the candidate will implement (Downs, 1957). When a state then votes or elects a politician, 
it represents the sum of voter preferences across that state. Along these lines, the VC industry can 
be considered similar to a state, in that firms are comprised of managers who, as individuals, have 
voting preferences and seek to maximize their utility 
Because political party orientation affects policies that are important to VCs (Cohen, 2003) 
– specifically tax, pro-entrepreneurship, and financial institution policies – political party 
affiliation may have an influence on VC, although it is not completely clear which party VCs 
prefer. On one hand, VCs are financially driven and may be interested in implementing policies 
related to lowering capital gains tax rates and small business incentives, or policies that align with 
the Republican Party platform. On the other hand, VC partners were once successful entrepreneurs 
at VC-backed companies, and generally, VC-backed entrepreneurs are known to be more aligned 
with the Democratic Party (Bonica, 2013). Using data gathered on over 100 million political 
contributions made by individuals and organizations to local, state, and national candidates from 
1979 to 2012, Bonica (2013) found that VC firms are much more balanced in their contributions 
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to both the Democratic and Republican parties than entrepreneurs from large VC-backed, 






Figure 4.1. Political contributions made by individuals and organizations to local, state, 




In the following sections, we describe our methodology for and present results on our 
evaluation of how political party orientation influences VC. In particular, we are interested in 
understanding if political party orientation of a governor has an effect on VC, as well as 
understanding if balance (i.e., Red governor/Blue president state) between a state’s preference for 
governor and president matters. We then observe the effects of stability of Republican 
gubernatorial regime, as well as the following policies: (1) capital gains tax rate, (2) a proxy for 
pro-entrepreneurship policy, and (3) a proxy for policies that improve the quality of financial 
markets.  Finally, we discuss policy mechanisms that might help explain political context effects.   
Data and Estimation 
Data 
Our empirical analysis relies on a balanced panel of the 50 U.S. states from 1980 to 2013. From 
the Thomson-Reuters’ VentureXpert dataset, which was used to gather data on VC investment, we 
included any deals realized in the considered time period and collected information about the 
amount of equity invested per deal, investment date, the location of both the investee and the 
investor, as well as the number of VC-backed IPOs. State election voting selections for governor 
and U.S. president were gathered using Dave Leip’s Atlas of Presidential Elections 
(http://uselectionatlas.org) (Kim, Pantzalis, and Chul Park, 2012; Pe’er and Gottschalg, 2011). The 
number of new firms for each state was gathered from the U.S. Census Business Dynamics 
Statistics (BDS) database, and maximum total capital gains tax rate was gathered from the National 
Bureau for Economic Research (NBER). Finally, we gathered state gross domestic product (GDP) 
data from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Overall, we 
constructed a balanced panel dataset of 1,700 state-year observations. The choice of the timeframe 
was determined by the fact that the Thomson-Reuters’ VentureXpert dataset, which was used to 
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gather data on VC investment, has limited coverage on investments realized in the 1970s (Gompers 
and Lerner, 2004). 
Variables 
Dependent variables 
Venture capital investment. Similarly to Samila and Sorenson (2011a), we defined VC investment 
as the equity investment associated with any VC deal and took into account all VC deals at 
different stages of financing: seed, early, later or in balanced stages. Deal equity was aggregated 
into state-year observations (by investee headquarter location and investment year), and a value of 
zero was assigned to 209 missing state-year observations. 
Independent variables 
Election dummy variables. We created dummy variables measuring the party affiliation of the 
popular vote selection for state gubernatorial and national presidential elections, as established 
by elections from 1980-2013. In particular, the Governor (Red) dummy equals 1 the year after a 
Republican governor is elected (when the governor actually sits in office) and 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, the President (Blue) dummy equals 1 the year after a Democrat wins the electoral 
votes from the state in a presidential election and 0 otherwise. Because elections in the U.S. are 
generally held in November, we assume that there exists an almost immediate effect on VC 
investments, starting in January of the following year. The excluded variable for the 
gubernatorial dummy is Governor (Blue) and the excluded variable for the presidential dummy is 
President (Red). Importantly, the dummy values remain constant until the subsequent 
gubernatorial and presidential elections, respectively.  
Governor stability. We created a variable measuring the stability (or consistency) of a state’s 
preference for a political party occupying the governor’s seat. From the beginning of the time 
98 
 
period in the sample, the Governor Stability variable is equal to 0 the first year a governor is 
serving in office and each subsequent year of her/his term is a cumulative sum of the previous 
consecutive years as governor. In the following gubernatorial election, if the incumbent (if 
retaining the same party affiliation) or another candidate with the same party affiliation is 
elected, the cumulative sum continues. However, if at any point, the opposing party candidate 
wins the election, the stability measure is reset to 0 in the first year that the opposing party 
governor is in office. 
Capital gains tax rate. Following previous studies on capital gains tax and VC (Gompers and 
Lerner, 1998; Poterba, 1989), we gathered data on maximum state and federal capital gains tax 
rates by each state-year as a measure of tax policy. Federal capital gains tax rates vary from state 
to state because of deductions that might be taken on federal taxes from state income taxes. We 
define Capital gains tax rate as the sum of both state and federal capital gains tax rates and 
represents the maximum possible rate that a VC might pay in capital gains from exited 
investments.   
New firms. As a proxy for the presence of pro-entrepreneurship policy, we gathered data on the 
number of new firms established by state each year. The definition of new firms, as defined by 
BDS, is the number of firms that have been formed less than one year before.   
IPOs. We use the number of IPOs as a proxy for the quality of financial institutions (Lerner and 
Tåg, 2013). IPOs is defined as the number of VC-backed companies that exit through an IPO. 
This variable was aggregated into state-year observations (by investee headquarter location and 






We include control variables in the regression to limit the possibility that our results are biased 
due to the omission of important confounding factors.  
State GDP. Using BEA data, we control for state gross domestic product (GDP), as it is a state-
specific, within-state factor that could possibly confound our results. For instance, in richer states, 
due to a more active economic environment, it is more likely that policymakers will vote for 
policies that will affect investment. 
State Fixed Effects. We included state-specific fixed effects, in order to control for all time-
invariant factors for each state. These effects may include factors, such as state culture. 
Year Fixed Effects. We included year dummies, in order to account for variations in the economic 
environment which might affect VC, such as, for instance, annual changes in interest rates, 
inflation, and national gross domestic product (GDP).  
The list of all variables and their measures is provided in Table 4.1. 
Methodology 
We evaluated the 34-year panel using a state fixed effects model. Thus, our methodology 
resembles a typical diff-and-diff strategy, through which we compare, for instance, whether states 
that voted for a Republican governor experience a change in VC investments more than states that 






Table 4.1 Operationalization of variables 
Variable Operationalization 
VC investment The amount of VC equity invested in each state (by location of investee company), in millions of 
nominal USD (all VC investments).  
Source: Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert. 
Governor (Red) Dummy equal to 1 if a state has elected a Republican governor.  
Sources: http://uselectionatlas.org 





Interaction of Governor (Red) and President (Blue).  
Source: http://uselectionatlas.org 
State GDP  Annual state gross domestic product, in millions of USD.  
Source: BEA. 
Governor stability The cumulative number of consecutive years that a governor’s party is in office following the first 
year of a governor’s term. 
Source: http://uselectionatlas.org 
Independent governor Dummy equal to 1 if a state has elected an Independent governor.  
Source: http://uselectionatlas.org 
Total capital gains tax 
rate 
The total (state and federal) maximum capital gains tax rate in each state. 
Source: NBER. 
New firms The number of firms that have an age of zero years in each state.  
Source: Business Dynamics Statistics. 
IPOs The number of venture-backed company IPOs in each state.  
Source: Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert. 
State fixed effects  The state in which an investee company headquarters is located. 
Source: Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert. 
Year fixed effects The year in which investments are made in investee companies.  
Source: Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert. 
 
Our baseline model includes year dummies to capture idiosyncratic shocks: 
ln	 	 , 	 _ ,
_ , 	ln	 , , (4.1) 
where i indexes the state and t indexes the year, β the unknown parameter vectors, VC 
investmenti,t is the amount of money invested in a certain state and year in VC deals, 
RED_GOVERNORi,t-1 and BLUE_PRESIDENTi,t-1 are the election dummy variables, 
STATEGDPi,t-1 is the state GDP control variable,  represents the series of year-fixed effects,  
represents state-fixed effects, and  is the error term. Regarding the error term, to account for 
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the presence of serial correlation and to avoid inconsistent standard errors, we clustered 
observations at the state-level – the state where companies that receive VC investment are 
located (Bertrand et al., 2004). 
We then observe whether states that voted for a Republican governor increase VC 
investments after voting for a Democratic presidential candidate, which is represented by the 
following: 
ln	 	 , 	 _ ,
_ , _ 	 	 _ ,
	 	ln	 , ,  (4.2) 
where (RED_GOVERNOR X BLUE_PRESIDENT)i,t-1 is the  interaction between the 
election dummy variables. 
Next, we observe whether states that are more consistent or stable in their support for 
Republican governors decrease VC investments, which is represented by the following: 
ln	 	 , 	 _ ,
_ , _ 	 	 _ ,
ln	 _ ,
_ 	 	 	 _ , 	 	ln	 ,
,  (4.3) 
where (RED_GOVERNOR X GOVERNOR_STABILITY)i,t-1 is the  interaction between the 
Red governor dummy variable and the log of governor stability. 
Finally, we evaluate the mechanisms that might help explain any political effects from 
balance, represented by the following: 
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ln	 	 , 	 _ ,
_ , _ 	 	 _ ,
_ ,
_ 	 	 _ , 		 	 ,
	ln	 , , ,  (4.4) 
where POLICYi,t-1 is one of three different policy mechanisms, namely the maximum 
combined state and federal capital gains tax rate, the log of the number of new firms, and the log 
of the number of IPOs. 
Results 
In Tables 4.2 and 4.3, we present the summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis and their pairwise correlations, respectively. First of all, we found that, as expected, 
equity investment is unevenly distributed across states, with California, Massachusetts and Texas 
accounting for a large portion of VC investment each year, while states such as Alaska and 
Wyoming report almost no VC investment. Concerning political affiliation, Red governors and 
states that voted Blue for president made up 48% and 37% of state-year observations, 









Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
VC investment 1,700 363.54 1,759.37 0.00 43,017.95 
Red governor 1,700 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Blue state – presidential election 1,700 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Red governor/Blue state 1,700 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
State GDP 1,700 176,321.22 249,599.40 4,856.00 2,202,678.00 
Government stability 1,700 5.63 5.60 0.00 33.00 
Capital gains tax rate 1,650 0.25 0.06 0.15 0.37 
New firms 1,650 9,704.57 11,235.72 862.00 74,879.00 
IPOs 1,700 1.68 6.38 0.00 123.00 
Table 4.3 Correlations 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. VC investment 1.00         
2. Red governor 0.01 1.00        
3. Blue state – 
presidential election 
0.18*** -0.08** 1.00       
4. Red governor/Blue 
state 
0.12*** 0.46*** 0.57*** 1.00      
5. State GDP 0.63*** 0.08** 0.24*** 0.20*** 1.00     
6. Government stability -0.01 0.04 0.12*** 0.02 0.07** 1.00    
7. Capital gains tax rate -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.17*** -0.09*** 1.00   
8. New firms 0.49*** 0.07** 0.08** 0.12*** 0.81*** -0.02 0.03 1.00  
9. IPOs 0.71*** 0.05 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.49*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.55*** 1.00 
 
 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
 
 
Regression results are shown in Table 4.4. In all baseline models, the dependent variable 
is (the log of) VC equity investment by state-year. Models include political affiliation variables, 
as well as the GDP variable and state and year fixed effects.  
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In Model 1, the political affiliation related to both the elected governor and the state’s 
preference for president did not have a significant effect on VC investment. In Model 2, the 
interaction of Red governor and Blue presidential state is added and found to be positive and 
significant (β3 = 0.176, p < 0.10). Finally, Model 3 includes government stability and the 
interaction of Red governor and government stability. The latter was found to be negative and 
significant (β5 = 0.203, p < 0.10), while the interaction of Red governor and Blue president state 
remained significant (β3 = -0.134, p < 0.10). Therefore, a balance of voting for a Blue presidential 
candidate when a state has elected a Red governor increases VC investment. 
In Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7, results are shown with the addition of proxy variables that may 
be influenced by a state’s political preference for governor and president. In Table 4.5, the 
dependent variable is maximum total capital gains tax rate in Model 1 and the log of VC investment 
in Model 2. A balance between a Red governor and Blue president state was shown to not have an 
effect on VC investment. However, the addition of capital gains tax rate to the baseline increased 
both the magnitude and significance of balance on investment (Table 4.5, Model 2: β3 = 0.219, p 











Table 4.4 Impact of partisanship on VC investment 









Governor (Red) 0.022 -0.043 0.135 
 (0.060) (0.070) (0.115) 
President (Blue) 0.065 -0.015 -0.033 
 (0.096) (0.111) (0.111) 
Balance (Red/Blue)  0.176* 0.203* 
  (0.102) (0.102) 
ln government stability   0.021 
   (0.049) 
Governor (Red) X    -0.134* 
ln government stability   (0.078) 
ln state GDP (t-1) 1.813*** 1.820*** 1.869*** 
 (0.376) (0.374) (0.375) 
Constant -17.436*** -17.472*** -18.037*** 
 (3.875) (3.859) (3.863) 
    
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Clusters (states) 50 50 50 
Observations 1,700 1,700 1,700 
Adj. R-squared  0.663 0.664 0.666 
 
Notes. OLS regression results in columns (1)-(4). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbances are 
clustered by state. The unit of observation is the state-year, and the data cover the 50 United States from 
1980 to 2013. In models (1)-(4), the dependent variable is the log of VC investment from all VC 
investment sources. 












Table 4.5 Capital gains tax rate and partisanship 
 
 
Notes. Fractional logit and OLS regression results in columns (1)-(2), respectively. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. Disturbances are clustered by state. The unit of observation is the state-year. In model (1), 
the dependent variable is maximum total (state and federal) capital gains tax rate. In model (2), the 
dependent variable is the log of VC investment from all VC investment sources. 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
 
In Table 4.6, the dependent variable is the log of the number of new firms in Model 1 and 
the log of VC investment in Model 2. Similar to the capital gains tax rate, political balance was 
not found to have an effect on the number of startup companies. The inclusion of a proxy for pro-
entrepreneurship policy to the baseline increased both the magnitude and significance of balance 
on investment (Table 4.6, Model 2: β3 = 0.233, p < 0.05). Additionally, the interaction between 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Capital gains tax rate ln VC investment 
Capital gains tax rate (t-1)  2.502 
  (4.635) 
Governor (Red) 0.014** 0.049 
 (0.007) (0.084) 
President (Blue) 0.006 -0.043 
 (0.008) (0.110) 
Balance (Red/Blue) -0.013 0.219** 
 (0.009) (0.103) 
ln government stability 0.001 0.007 
 (0.001) (0.009) 
Governor (Red) X  -0.002 -0.024 
ln government stability (0.001) (0.015) 
ln state GDP (t-1) -0.036 1.884*** 
 (0.038) (0.373) 
Constant -0.602 -18.869*** 
 (0.393) (4.288) 
   
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clusters (states) 50 50 
Observations 1,650 1,700 
Adj. R-squared - 0.665 
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Red governor and the log of governor stability was negative and significant (Table 4.6, Model 2: 
β5 = -0.027, p < 0.10). In both tables, capitals gains tax rate and new firms do not have any 
significant effect on VC investment. 
In Table 4.7, the dependent variable is the log of the number of IPOs, as a proxy for the 
quality of financial markets, in Model 1 and the log of VC investment in Model 2. In Model 1, 
results show that balance has a positive and significant effect on the number of IPOs (Table 4.7, 
Model 1: β3 = 0.107, p < 0.10). When the number of IPOs is added as an independent variable to 
the baseline, this variable was also positive and significant on VC investment (Table 4.7, Model 
2: β6 = 0.108, p < 0.05). Political balance remained positive and significant (Table 4.7, Model 2: 
β3 = 0.199, p < 0.10) and the interaction of Red governor and the log of governor stability was 
negative and significant (Table 4.7, Model 2: β5 = -0.148, p < 0.10). Although Model 2 tests the 
number of IPOs at time t-1, Model 3 operationalizes this measure at time t to make sure that an 
increase in equity distributions is not driven by reinvested cash proceeds from IPO exits. Results 
show that this is not a concern, as the measure remains positive and significant (Table 4.7, Model 
3: β6 = 0.127, p < 0.01).   
Because there may be a concern that results are driven by states where major VC activity 
occurs, robustness checks were conducted. This concern is particularly salient for pre-Clinton 
California. It was a Republican stronghold for presidential elections from 1952-1988 (only voting 
Blue in the 1964 election), but as a result of the 1992 election Democratic platform, it has 
developed into a guaranteed Blue state. Table 4.8 shows that even when excluding California in 
Model 1 and when excluding California, Massachusetts, and New York in Model 2, results hold 
for balance, the number of IPOs, and red governor stability.  
Another concern may be the exclusion of variables that identify third-party candidates 
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who do not affiliate with the Republican or Democrat parties. First, we test the robustness of 
results to the exclusion of state-year observations with Independent governors (Model 1). In 
Model 2, we also excluded the 1992 presidential election – and so the state-year observations 
from 1993-1996 – where Ross Perot, an Independent candidate, obtained 18.9% of the popular  
Table 4.6 Entrepreneurship and partisanship 
 (1) (2) 
Variables ln new firms ln VC investment 
ln new firms (t-1)  0.607 
  (0.462) 
Governor (Red) -0.002 0.057 
 (0.014) (0.086) 
President (Blue) -0.027 -0.030 
 (0.019) (0.110) 
Balance (Red/Blue) -0.044** 0.233** 
 (0.017) (0.110) 
ln government stability -0.001 0.008 
 (0.001) (0.009) 
Governor (Red) X  0.006** -0.027* 
ln government stability (0.002) (0.014) 
ln state GDP (t-1) 0.711*** 1.415** 
 (0.085) (0.610) 
Constant 1.376 -18.667*** 
 (0.878) (4.069) 
   
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clusters (states) 50 50 
Observations 1,650 1,700 
Adj. R-squared 0.693 0.667 
 
Notes. OLS regression results in columns (1)-(2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbances are 
clustered by state. The unit of observation is the state-year. In model (1), the dependent variable is the log 
of new firms. In model (2), the dependent variable is the log of VC investment from all VC investment 
sources. 





Table 4.7 Initial public offerings and partisanship 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ln IPOs ln VC investment ln VC investment 
ln IPOs (t-1)  0.108**  
  (0.047)  
ln IPOs   0.127*** 
   (0.392) 
Governor (Red) 0.015 0.164 0.133 
 (0.062) (0.115) (0.114) 
President (Blue) -0.084 -0.035 -0.022 
 (0.057) (0.112) (0.109) 
Balance (Red/Blue) 0.107* 0.199* 0.189* 
 (0.062) (0.101) (0.100) 
ln government stability 0.011 0.028 0.020 
 (0.028) (0.049) (0.049) 
Governor (Red) X  -0.030 -0.148* -0.130* 
ln government stability (0.036) (0.079) (0.077) 
ln state GDP (t-1) 0.324*** 1.811*** 1.828*** 
 (0.114) (0.346) (0.367) 
Constant -3.323*** -17.228*** -17.616*** 
 (1.210) (3.587) (3.785) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Clusters (states) 50 50 50 
Observations 1,700 1,650 1,700 
Adj. R-squared 0.260 0.648 0.667 
 
Notes. OLS regression results in columns (1)-(2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbances are 
clustered by state. The unit of observation is the state-year. In model (1), the dependent variable is the log 
of the number of IPOs from venture-backed companies. In model (2), the dependent variable is the log of 
VC investment from all VC investment sources. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
 
vote. As shown in Table 4.9, results are significantly similar.  
Finally, we observe the effects of a Blue governor/Red state political configuration in Table 4.10. 
In both models, while balance is significant only to the 12% confidence level, it still has a positive effect 
on VC (Table 4.10, Model 1: β3 B/R = 0.171, p < 0.12; Model 2: β3 B/R = 0.168, p < 0.12), which shows 
that balance is reasonably similar in either scenario. One difference, however, is that stability in a 
Democratic gubernatorial regime seems to have a positive effect on VC. 
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Table 4.8 Impact of partisanship on VC investment: Excluding major VC states 
 (1) (2) 
 
Variables 
ln VC investment 
(excl. CA) 
ln VC investment (excl. 
CA, MA, & NY) 
ln IPOs (t-1) 0.123** 0.147*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) 
Governor (Red) 0.169 0.199* 
 (0.118) (0.118) 
President (Blue) -0.039 -0.063 
 (0.113) (0.115) 
Balance (Red/Blue) 0.201* 0.223** 
 (0.105) (0.109) 
ln government stability 0.033 0.049 
 (0.049) (0.048) 
Governor (Red) X  -0.146* -0.170** 
ln government stability (0.081) (0.081) 
ln state GDP (t-1) 1.807*** 1.859*** 
 (0.346) (0.342) 
Constant -17.199*** -17.770*** 
 (3.574) (3.509) 
   
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clusters (states) 49 47 
Observations 1,617 1,551 
Adj. R-squared 0.643 0.634 
 
Notes. OLS regression results in columns (1)-(2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbances are 
clustered by state. The unit of observation is the state-year. In all models, the dependent variable is the log 
of VC investment from all VC investment sources. In model (1), California is excluded from the sample. 
In model (2), California, Massachusetts, and New York are excluded. State-year observations with 
independent governors are also excluded. 









Table 4.9 Impact of partisanship on VC investment: Excluding observations with 
independent governors and the 1992 election (with Ross Perot) 
 (1) (2) 
Variables ln VC investment ln VC investment 
ln IPOs (t-1) 0.102** 0.118*** 
 (0.046) (0.041) 
Governor (Red) 0.189 0.248* 
 (0.116) (0.128) 
President (Blue) -0.019 -0.008 
 (0.110) (0.112) 
Balance (Red/Blue) 0.203* 0.240** 
 (0.104) (0.112) 
ln government stability 0.042 0.061 
 (0.050) (0.056) 
Governor (Red) X  -0.159** -0.204** 
ln government stability (0.079) (0.085) 
ln state GDP (t-1) 1.790*** 1.769*** 
 (0.345) (0.349) 
Constant -17.036*** -16.844*** 
 (3.590) (3.621) 
   
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clusters (states) 50 50 
Observations 1,617 1,551 
Adj. R-squared 0.648 0.679 
 
Notes. OLS regression results in columns (1)-(2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbances are 
clustered by state. The unit of observation is the state-year. In both models, the dependent variable is the 
log of VC investment from all VC investment sources. State-year observations with independent 
governors are excluded. In model (2), the 1992 election (and thus observations from 1993-1996) are 
excluded.  








Table 4.10 Impact of partisanship on VC investment: Blue governor/Red presidential state 
 (1) (2) 
Variables ln VC investment ln VC investment 
ln IPOs (t-1)  0.110** 
  (0.047) 
Governor (Blue) -0.320** -0.346** 
 (0.133) (0.145) 
President (Red) -0.153 -0.149 
 (0.110) (0.113) 
Balance (Blue/Red) 0.171 0.168 
 (0.106) (0.105) 
ln government stability -0.100** -0.106** 
 (0.047) (0.047) 
Governor (Blue) X  0.134* 0.148** 
ln government stability (0.072) (0.073) 
ln state GDP (t-1) 1.855*** 1.794*** 
 (0.375) (0.346) 
Constant -17.600*** -16.745*** 
 (3.880) (3.624) 
   
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clusters (states) 50 50 
Observations 1,700 1,650 
Adj. R-squared 0.665 0.648 
 
Notes. OLS regression results in columns (1)-(2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbances are 
clustered by state. The unit of observation is the state-year. In both models, the dependent variable is the 
log of VC investment from all VC investment sources.  








Discussion and Conclusion 
Extant literature evaluates the role that policies have in driving VC investment (Gompers and 
Lerner, 2004; Lerner and Tåg, 2013; Da Rin et al., 2006). However, little is known about the 
impact of political context, and in particular, political party affiliation of policymakers, on VC. In 
this paper, we focus on how a state’s political preference for its executive branch leader, the 
governor, and for the nation’s executive branch leader, the president, affects VC investment within 
states across the U.S. 
Exploiting longitudinal variations in the party affiliation of elected governors and a state’s 
section for president across the U.S., we do not find evidence that party affiliation of a governor 
or presidential candidate directly influences the amount of VC investment in a state. Thus, political 
orientation of a state, in terms of preference for a governor or presidential candidate, does not seem 
to matter to VCs. However, when a state elects a Red governor and also votes for a Blue 
presidential candidate, VC investment increases by 18 percent. In addition, we find that as the 
number of consecutive years a Republican governor sits in office increases by 10 percent, VC 
investment decreases by 1.3 percent. Finally, we show that policies that improve the quality of 
financial markets for VC exits might contribute to the explanation on why the political effect from 
balance is positive. 
While political science literature refers to balancing as split-ticket voting within the same 
level of government (i.e., state or national) (Fiorina, 1991), we extend this definition to 
gubernatorial and presidential candidates. The positive and significant effect of balance on VC 
investment suggests that balance leads to more VC investment, which is consistent with how VCs 
donate funds to political campaigns (Bonica, 2013). One possible explanation for this effect 
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follows Fiorina (1991) and the notion that balance leads to moderation or less extreme policies, 
which decreases uncertainty about the environment.  
Because politicians might be less complacent about their chances for re-election when a 
state votes for balance rather than continually voting for the same party in both gubernatorial and 
presidential elections (Zupan, 1991), balance might also lead to increases in efficiency and 
effectiveness through policies that influence VC. Even though the capital gains tax rate and the 
number of new firms were not found to drive such an effect on investment, results show that (1) 
balance has a positive and significant effect on the number of IPOs, as a proxy for the quality of 
financial institutions, and (2) balance and IPOs both contribute to a positive effect on VC 
investment (Black and Gilson, 1998; Michelacci and Suarez, 2004). Regarding a state’s political 
orientation and its correlation with the quality of financial institutions, it seems that balance would 
signal a more predictable policy environment over time (Fowler, 2006), which would be important 
for companies looking to go public and a major consideration of institutional investors when 
funding an IPO. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it extends the literature on the 
impact of institutions on investment (Lerner and Tåg, 2013; Taussig and Delios, 2014). It suggests 
that political context is an important consideration by investors and helps determine where 
investments are made. In particular, we investigate whether political party orientation, which helps 
shape the institutional environment, has an impact on VC distributions.  
Second, it extends the literature on political context and its effect on VC (Pe’er and 
Gottschalg, 2011). Previous literature has shown that political context influences outcomes that 
are important to VCs, such as firm performance (Kim et al., 2012; Pe’er and Gottschalg, 2011), 
but has failed to directly apply it to VC. We observe the investment impact of political party 
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affiliation of a governor or a presidential candidate and test how the stability of a party’s 
gubernatorial regime influences the geography in which VCs invest. Additionally, we test tax, 
entrepreneurship, and financial market policies as mechanisms to explain the political effects on 
VC, adding to the literature on policy and VC (Gompers and Lerner, 2001).   
Third, we fill a gap on the topic of VC and partisanship, evaluating how state and national 
election outcomes might affect VC. In this study, we do not find evidence that the political party 
orientation of a state directly affects VC investment, per se, but that voting for party balance 
between governor and president does. This result not only gives us insights into the types of 
environments that VCs find conducive to invest in but also suggests that elections play an 
important role in determining the future of innovation and entrepreneurship in a state and country. 
This empirical study has some limitations. First, a shortcoming of our study is that the 
database we use for retrieving information on VC exits, VentureXpert, has limited data available 
on investments for the 1970s (Gompers and Lerner, 2004). Therefore, the number VC-backed IPOs 
reported in the early 1980s would be lower than the actual volume of IPOs. Another limitation is 
that we use a number of proxies as mechanisms that may explain the political party effect on VC 
investment. Future research should seek to further dissect these measures to better understand how 
specific policies influence on VC activity. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study points to implications for both managers and 
policymakers. Entrepreneurs might choose to locate their companies in Red governor/Blue 
president states, where VC investment is higher. They might also be actively involved in the 




Concerning implications to policymakers, this study provides evidence that might suggest 
that states with less extreme political preferences attract more VC investment. We find that 
increases in the stability of a Republican gubernatorial regime leads to a decrease in VC 
investment. Particularly in states looking to improve economic development, these results may 
inform campaign strategy in states with a Red governor. Additionally, policymakers might seek to 
improve the quality of financial markets, as a way of increasing VC investment. Future studies 
might investigate other measures beyond the proxies tested in this paper to better understand 
specific policies which have been implemented, such as immigration reform or regulatory policies. 
Furthermore, analyzing direct measures, rather than proxies, will help explain the mechanism to a 
















5 Summary and Conclusions 
This dissertation investigates the effects of institutional environment on investment and 
performance in the private equity industry. It provides insights on how trade secret protection 
can increase venture capital investment through a state court’s favorability toward the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine, the effect of anti-takeover regulation as it relates to private equity firm 
buyout performance, and the role that political context has in determining venture capital 
distributions to different states. As such, it provides a deeper understanding of how certain 
institutional factors shape VC activity across geographies. 
The second chapter discusses how a form of trade secret protection, the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine, affects the geography of venture capital investment. If a state favors the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine, (1) it could reduce the possibility of employees from leaving 
investee firms to join a competing company and (2) it would increase the predictability of a 
subsequent court ruling on the doctrine. Compared with having no rule, a rule in favor of 
inevitable disclosure increases VC investment in a state by 83 percent, whereas a rule against 
inevitable increases VC investment by 30 percent. Additionally, having a rule in favor of 
inevitable disclosure increases the proportion of VC investment in deals with at least one non-
local investor by 6 percent compared with having no rule on the doctrine.  
The third chapter presents that experience acquired from buyouts in the PE industry 
translates more into learning to select targets, rather than learning to add value, such that more 
experienced PE firms perform better when the educational background of top managers at the PE 
firm is more finance oriented. Conversely, performance is worse when the educational 
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background of top managers are more business oriented and the information environment is 
more transparent.  
 The fourth chapter discusses how political party orientation influences venture capital 
investment. Political orientation of a state, in terms of preference for a governor or presidential 
candidate, does not seem to matter to VC. However, when a state elects a Red governor and also 
votes for a Blue presidential candidate, VC investment increases by 18 percent. In addition, we 
find that as the number of consecutive years a Republican governor sits in office increases by 10 
percent, VC investment decreases by 1.3 percent. Finally, we show that policies that improve the 
quality of financial markets for VC exits might contribute to the explanation on why the political 
effect from balance is positive. 
  This work will hopefully lead to deeper investigations into additional institutional factors 
that affect private equity investment. Such extensions to the current literature would certainly 
benefit entrepreneurship ecosystems, as findings can better inform policymaking.  
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